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Abstract
In this paper, we use administrative data on tax returns to characterize the distributions of before 
and after-tax income, tax liabilities, and tax credits in Spain for individuals and households. We 
use the most recent available data, 2015 for individuals and 2013 for households, but also 
discuss how the income distribution and taxes have changed since 2002. We also estimate 
effective tax functions that capture the underlying heterogeneity of the data in a parsimonious 
way. These parametric functions can be used to calculate after-tax incomes in surveys 
where this information is not directly available, and can also be used in quantitative work in 
macroeconomics and public fi nance.
Keywords: personal income tax, tax functions, income distribution.
JEL classifi cation: E62, H24, H31.
Resumen
Este artículo utiliza datos administrativos sobre declaraciones del IRPF con objeto de caracterizar 
la distribución de la renta antes y después de impuestos, la distribución de la cuota del impuesto 
y la distribución de los benefi cios fi scales, tanto para los individuos como para los hogares. 
El análisis se basa en los datos más recientes (año 2015 para los individuos y año 2013 para 
los hogares), aunque también se describe cómo ha evolucionado la distribución de la renta y el 
impuesto desde el año 2002. Asimismo, el artículo estima las funciones efectivas del impuesto 
sobre la renta, que son capaces de sintetizar la heterogeneidad de los datos de un modo 
sencillo. Estas funciones paramétricas pueden utilizarse para calcular la renta después de 
impuestos en encuestas que carecen de esta información, así como en modelos cuantitativos 
en macroeconomía y política fi scal.
Palabras clave: impuesto sobre la renta, funciones del impuesto, distribución de la renta.
Códigos JEL: E62, H24, H31.
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1Heathcote et al. (2009) and Krueger et al. (2016) provide recent reviews of this literature. For quantitative
macro studies on the Spanish tax and transfer system, see among others, Rojas (2005), Gonza´lez and Pijoan-Mas
(2006), Dı´az-Gime´nez and Dı´az-Saavedra (2009), Sa´nchez Mart´ın and Sa´nchez Marcos (2010), Dı´az-Gime´nez and
Dı´az-Saavedra (2017) and Guner et al. (2018).
2An alternative is the microsimulation approach, that simulates the incidence of tax reforms on a representative
sample of taxpayers. Microsimulation models can be either non-behavioral or behavioral. Non-behavioral ones
are accounting models that simply simulate the taxpayers’ tax liabilities taking into account the design of the
tax code (e.g. statutory rates, tax benefits, etc.). As such, they ignore the response of individuals to the tax
changes, e.g. changes in the labor supply that might result from changes in taxes. While behavioral models
rely on an accounting model, which computes net incomes under different choices and tax structures, they also
contain behavioral microeconometric models that allow for such responses. The microsimulation approach can be
used to estimate the consequences of very detailed tax reforms, since the accounting model provides an in-depth
characterization of the tax code. However, this type of evaluations is usually carried out in partial equilibrium, since
the exhaustive depiction of the tax system is difficult to integrate in macro models featuring general equilibrium. See
Labeaga et al. (2008) for an evaluation of personal income tax reforms in Spain under a behavioral microsimulation
approach, and Peichl (2016) for a discussion of the linking between microsimulation and computational general
equilibrium models.
3The data covers 15 Spanish regions and 2 autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla). Two Spanish regions, the
Basque Country and Navarre have their own independent tax collection authority and are not included in the
dataset.
1 Introduction
This paper makes two contributions. First, we use administrative data on tax returns to charac-
terize the distributions of before and after-tax income, tax liabilities, and tax credits in Spain. We
also calculate effective average and marginal tax rates that individuals and households face. We
use the most recent available data, 2015 for individuals and 2013 for households, but also discuss
how the income distribution and taxes have changed since 2002. Second, we provide estimates of
effective tax functions. These functions map gross incomes of individuals or households into taxes
that they pay, summarizing the complicated structure of taxes in easy-to-interpret and easy-to-use
parametric forms. As such, they provide valuable inputs for quantitative studies of fiscal policy in
models with heterogeneous agents.1, 2 Our approach follows Gouveia and Strauss (1994), Heath-
cote et al. (2017), and Guner et al. (2014), who estimate tax functions of the US personal income
tax. Calonge and Conesa (2003) provide estimates of effective tax functions for Spain for the early
1990s.
Our data come from an administrative dataset containing a stratified random sample of tax
returns, which includes a large set of fiscal and socio-demographic information that taxpayers
provide in their returns.3 The dataset is representative of the population of Spanish taxpayers and
income variables are not censored, which makes it ideal for our purposes. The dataset has both
a cross-section and a panel component. Repeated cross-sections are available from 2002 to 2015,
and they have a large sample size. The 2015 sample contains 2.7 million observations, about 14%
of the population. It is not possible, however, to match household members, a husband and wife
who file individual tax returns, in this data set. The panel dataset covers the period 1999-2013
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and has a smaller sample size, but allows us to link individual tax-filers from the same household,
and compute taxes at the household level.4
The key takeaways from our analysis of the data are as follows: First, the data exhibits a
significant degree of inequality, both in incomes and tax liabilities. The bottom (top) quintile of the
income distribution accounts for about 4.6% (47.1%) of gross income, and the share accounted for
by the top 1% is about 9.5%. A similar picture emerges for households. The top (bottom) quintiles
account for 4.4% (49.9%) of gross income, and the top 1% accounts for 9.7% of gross income. The
Gini coefficients for individual and household gross incomes are 0.42 and 0.45, respectively. Second,
given the progressive tax system in Spain, tax liabilities are even more unequally distributed. The
top quintile, which accounts for 47.1% of gross income, pays about 73.2% of taxes, while the
share of the top 1% in total tax liabilities is 21%. As a result, the after-tax income distribution
is more equal than the before-tax income distribution. The shares of the top quintile and top
1% of taxpayers in after-tax individual income decline to 42.8% and 7.6%, respectively. The Gini
coefficients for after-tax income are 0.38 for individuals and 0.40 and households. Our analysis also
shows that the Gini coefficients for both before and after-tax incomes have been fairly stable since
2002. Other measures of income inequality, such as 90-to-10 and 50-to-10 income ratios, however,
did increase since the 2008 crisis. Our estimates of the household income distribution are quite
similar to the ones we obtain from the Bank of Spain’s Survey of Household Finances (Encuesta
Financiera de las Familias or the EFF).5
Third, labor income constitutes the most important source of total income for most house-
holds. Even at the top quintile, it represents about 87.1% of total income. The capital and
self-employment income, on the other hand, account for a more significant share of total income
for the top 1% of taxpayers. About 24.1% and 12.7% of their total income comes from capital
and self-employment income, respectively. Interestingly, capital and self-employment income also
account for a large share of income at the lower end of the income distribution. Fourth, we find
that higher income quintiles enjoy larger tax deductions, which lower their taxable income, and
larger tax credits, which lower their tax liabilities. The top quintile, for example, accounts for
25.2% of all deductions and 28% of all credits. The same numbers for the bottom quintile are
16.1% and 4.9%, respectively. This reflects both the fact that some benefits, such as deductions
due to social security contributions or due to contributions to private pension plans, are enjoyed
more by richer households, and the fact that poorer households are more likely to reach quickly
zero tax liabilities due to deductions and credits.
4Based on the same data, Haugh and Mart´ınez-Toledano (2017) analyze the income distribution, taxes and tax
benefits for the period 2002-2011. They assess differences in such distributions by gender and province, and focus
on changes before and after the economic crisis.
5Anghel et al. (2018) provide an analysis of changes in income, consumption and wealth distribution in Spain
in recent years.
Finally, there is also a large dispersion in effective average tax rates that individuals face.
About 37% of all taxpayers do not pay any taxes. Indeed, effective rates are close to zero in the
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6Lo´pez-Laborda et al. (2018) discusses how this dual tax system creates incentives for the taxpayers to shift
their income base from labor to capital.
two lowest quintiles. The top quintile faces an average effective tax rate of 19.0%, while the tax
rate for the top 1% is 30.6%.
The tax system in Spain taxes the so-called general income, which mainly consists of labor
and self-employment income, and savings income, which mainly consists of capital income, at
different rates. Taxes on general income are higher and more progressive than taxes on savings
income.6 Hence, to each of these income categories certain deductions are applied and then the
corresponding tax liabilities are calculated. Tax liabilities corresponding to these two categories
are then summed, and tax credits are applied to the total tax liabilities to figure out what the
taxpayer owes to the state. Given this structure, for the estimation of the effective tax function, we
follow two different approaches. First, we estimate one single function for the final tax liabilities
as a function of gross income for each year between 2002 and 2015. We focus on two different
specifications: one proposed by Benabou (2002) and Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017),
which we call the HSV specification, and the GS specification, used by Gouveia and Strauss (1994).
In our estimation we account for the fact that low incomes are subject to zero effective tax rates,
and estimate an income threshold below which tax liabilities are zero. In the second approach, we
estimate three different functions: a function that relates general income to general tax rates; a
second function that links the savings income to the savings tax rates; and a third function that
accounts for the amount of tax credits as a function of total gross income. We show that both
approaches result in tax functions that accurately estimate both the level and the distribution of
the tax liabilities observed in the data. As an illustration of the use of these tax functions, we
apply them to the EFF survey data and calculate after-tax incomes for each household, a variable
not available in the original survey.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Spanish Personal Income
Tax. Section 3 describes the dataset and lays out the definitions and sample restrictions. Section 4
presents the basic facts of the income and tax distributions. Section 5 presents the parametric esti-
mates of the tax functions. Section 6 presents the basic facts of the after-tax income distributions
for administrative and survey data. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Spanish Personal Income Tax
2.1 Overview
The Spanish Personal Income Tax (PIT) or Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas F´ısicas
(IRPF), taxes the income of Spanish residents.7 Table 1 documents different sources of tax revenue
for Spain, Euro Area and the OECD countries in 2015. The total tax collection with the PIT is
7Income subject to the PIT corresponds to worldwide income, although a number of bilateral agreements
eliminates double taxation.
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The tax is withheld at source and each year, between April and June, taxpayers must file a
tax return based on the previous calendar year’s total income. In 2015, all taxpayers with a labor
income above e22,000, or with a capital income (excluding income from real-estate) above e1,600,
or with a real-estate income above e1,000, or with any income from self-employment had to file a
tax return. Many taxpayers below the labor income threshold, around 81% of them in 2015, still
choose to file a tax return, since they are likely to obtain a refund due to tax credits. Tax returns
can be filed single or jointly. Single tax returns are filed at the individual level, whereas joint tax
returns can be filed by spouses or single-parent families with at least one dependent child.
Figure 1 provides a simplified version of the 2015 tax code. Income subject to the tax can
be of several types: labor income, capital income (both from financial assets and real-estate) and
self-employment income. From these gross income sources, a set of deductible expenses can be
subtracted, which include, among others, social security contributions paid by the employee, a
Table 1
Distribution of Tax Revenues in 2015 (% of GDP)
Tax
Revenue
Personal
Income
Tax
Social
Security
Contribu-
tions
Value
Added
Taxes
Other
Taxes PIT
Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spain 33.8% 7.2% 11.4% 6.4% 8.8% 21.3%
Euro Area 11 38.8% 9.4% 12.2% 7.0% 10.2% 24.3%
OECD 34.0% 8.5% 8.9% 6.7% 9.8% 24.5%
Source: OECD Tax Statistics (http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00262-en).
Notes: The Personal Income Tax column corresponds to the category 1100 Taxes on income, profits and
capital gains of individuals, of the OECD classification of taxes. The Euro-Area and the OECD averages
exclude Spain.
7.2% of the GDP and 21% of total tax revenue in Spain. It represents the second largest source of
tax revenue after the social security contributions. As a fraction of GDP, Spain collects around 2.2
and 1.3 percentage points less revenue from the PIT than the Euro Area and the OECD averages,
respectively.8
8See Herna´ndez de Cos and Lo´pez-Rodr´ıguez (2014) and Lo´pez-Rodr´ıguez and Garc´ıa Ciria (2018) for a de-
scription of income and social security taxes in Spain in the context of the European Union and the OECD.
deduction for earning any labor income, and business expenses associated to self-employment.9
The result of this subtraction results in adjusted gross income.
Adjusted gross income is then grouped into two categories, which are subsequently taxed at
different rates. The first type of income is called general income and includes labor income, self-
employment income and some forms of capital income (mainly, income from real state).10 The
9There are two deductions for earning labor income. First, all taxpayers are eligible for a e2,000 deduction.
Second, an additional deduction of up to e3,700 is given to taxpayers whose labor income is below e14,450. These
quantities are further increased for some groups of taxpayers, such as disabled workers, or unemployed who had
moved to a different location in order to start a new job.
10Other forms of capital income that are in general income include incomes that come from the participation in
common property regimes and other civil associations, such as unsettled estates or communities of property owners.
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(e.g. realized capital gains, dividend payments, and interest income).11 To each type of income
a set of tax deductions are applied. Deductions that can be applied to general income include a
tax deduction for couples filing jointly and contributions to private pension plans.12 If the total
deductions exceed the general income, taxpayers can apply some of the remaining deductions to
the savings income. The subtraction of these deductions from general and savings income results
in concepts called general taxable income and savings taxable income.
General and savings taxable income are then taxed according to different tax schedules. The
tax schedules are split into a state and a region portion, since around half of the tax revenue is
transferred to the regions, which are entitled to design their tax schedules and introduce their own
tax benefits.13 In 2015 the state general tax schedule consisted of 5 tax brackets and a top marginal
rate of 22.5%. The regional general tax schedule, which is applied on top of the state one, varies
across regions. For example, the tax schedule in Catalonia (the largest Spanish region in terms of
GDP in 2015) consisted of 6 tax brackets and a top marginal tax rate of 25.5%, whereas that of the
Community of Madrid (the second largest region) has 5 tax brackets and a top marginal rate of
21.0%. Therefore, taxpayers in Catalonia faced a top marginal rate of 48% (22.5% + 25.5%), while
Madrid taxpayers were subject to a top marginal rate of 43.5% (22.5% + 21.0%). The savings
tax schedule is much less progressive. In 2015 the state portion consisted of 3 brackets and a top
marginal rate of 11.5%, whereas the region portion, which did not differ across regions, comprised
3 brackets and a top rate of 12.0%. Figure 2 shows the tax schedules in the two selected regions
in 2015.
11In 2015 savings income covered slightly more than 60% of total capital income.
12In 2015, the deduction on couples filing jointly amounted to e3,400, while the limit on contributions to private
pension plans was set to e8,000.
13In practice, the Spanish system of regional financing is complex, see de la Fuente (2010) for a detailed de-
scription. Roughly speaking, regions keep 25% of their tax collection and either receive or contribute money in net
terms from two funds aiming at ensuring sufficient financing for each region and a homogenous provision of public
services deemed essential, such as health and education. Regions can also raise money from financial markets by
issuing debt.
Gross tax liabilities, which are calculated by applying state and region tax schedules to general
and savings taxable income, are then reduced by a series of tax credits. First, a family allowance
is subtracted from the gross tax liabilities from general taxable income. The amount of the family
allowance depends on the characteristics of the taxpayer and their family, such as age, number of
dependent children, number of dependent parents, and disability status of the taxpayer and other
family members.14 The actual amount that is subtracted from gross tax liabilities is calculated
by applying the general tax schedules to the family allowance. For example, if the total family
allowance is e5,500, which is below the first income threshold in panel A of Figure 2, then tax
14In 2015, this allowance was e5,550 for the taxpayer (e6,700 and e6,950 for taxpayers older than 65 and 75,
respectively), plus e2,400 for the first child, e2,700 for the second, e4,000 for the third, etc; plus e1,150 for each
dependent parent older than 65, and e1,400 for each dependent parent older than 75; plus e3,000 for each disabled
member of the household (e9,000 euro for severe disabilities). Furthermore, the allowance for children is increased
if they are less than 3 years old. Also note that regions can modify these amounts.
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Figure 2
Statutory Marginal Tax Rates (2015)
Panel A: General Income:
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Notes: This figure shows the statutory marginal tax rates of the personal income tax in 2015 for residents in Catalonia and Madrid.
Panel A displays the rates applied to general income. Panel B shows the tax rates of savings income.
Figure 1
Structure of the Spanish Personal Income Tax (2015)
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liabilities are reduced by e5,500 × 0.095 = e522.5. If the general taxable income of a taxpayer
is less than their family allowance, then the extra amount of the family allowance can be used to
reduce the gross tax liabilities from savings taxable income.
After subtracting the family allowance, the tax liabilities from the state general income and
state savings income are pooled together. Similarly, the region tax liabilities (from general and
savings income) are also added up. To these two types of tax liabilities a set of non-refundable tax
credits are applied. Non-refundable tax credits include part of mortgage payments (if the house
was purchased before 2013) and an extended set of regional and state tax credits.15 Finally, tax
liabilities are further reduced by a set of refundable tax credits. In 2015, such credits were provided
for employed mothers with children below 3 years old, taxpayers with disabled parents or children,
single-parent families with at least two children, and large families (those with 3 or more children,
or 2 children when at least one of them is disabled). The amount of the tax credit given to large
families is limited to e2,400, while the rest cannot be larger than e1,200.16
In order to summarize the structure of taxes, let GIj for j = l, k, e be the gross income from
labor (l), capital (k) and self-employment (e). Adjusted gross income (AGIj) is obtained by
15The region-specific tax credits, which can be means-tested, include credits for taking care of disabled or
elderly, births, adoptions, large families, school expenses, donations, housing expenses, etc. Other state tax credits
are granted to, among others, charity donations and renters earning income below a certain threshold. The state
tax credit for renters has been phased out since 2015.
16The most important refundable credit is the one provided to employed mothers with children below 3. In 2015,
close to 750,000 women received it, which represented close to 4% of the total number of tax returns, being granted
around e935 on average. The refundable tax credit granted to large families comes next, which accrued to close to
500,000 taxpayers (2.6% of the total) and amounted to e945 on average.
subtracting deductions (Dj) from the gross income. Adjusted gross income from labor, capital
and self-employment are then grouped together under two categories: general income (g) and
savings income (s), i.e.,
GIj −Dj = AGIj for j = l, k, e,
and
AGI =
∑
j
AGIj = AGIg + AGIs.
FAg =
{
min(TIg, FA) if TIg > 0
0, otherwise
.
Then another set of deductions (ODg) are subtracted from AGIg to obtain general taxable income:
TIg = AGIg −ODg.
The family allowance (FA) is calculated as a function of the taxpayer and their family character-
istics. The allowance pertaining to the general income (FAg) is computed as:
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The gross tax liabilities that corresponds to TIg are then calculated as:
GTLg = τg(TIg)− τg(FAg),
where τg is the general tax schedule.
In order to obtain the gross tax liabilities for savings income (GTLs), the savings adjusted
gross income (AGIs) is reduced by unused portions of ODg (denoted by ODs) to obtain the
savings taxable income (TIs = AGIs−ODs).17 The family allowance pertaining to savings income
(FAs) is computed as:
FAs = min(TIs, FA− FAg).
Then, the tax liabilities for savings income are calculated as follows:
GTLs = τs(TIs)− τs(FAs),
where τs is the savings tax schedule.
Finally, the two gross tax liabilities are summed and nonrefundable and refundable tax credits
(NTC and TC) are subtracted to obtain tax liabilities:
TL = min(0, GTLg +GTLs −NTC)− TC.
17In practice, only certain elements of ODg can be used in ODs
a slowing economy. In contrast, after 2008, the sharp fall in the GDP and the subsequent dete-
rioration of the budget balance led to sizable tax increases between 2010 and 2012. Once again,
following the recent economic recovery, significant tax cuts took place in 2015.
The first major reform of the personal income tax during the 21st century was in 2003. It
involved a reduction in the number of tax brackets (from 6 to 5) and tax rates (the top marginal
tax rate was reduced from 48% to 45%). There was also an increase in the family allowance (e.g.
for a taxpayer with 2 children, by about e600) and a tax credit of e1,200 on employed mothers
with at least one child below age 3 was introduced. In 2007 the government implemented a big
reform, which consisted of a further reduction of tax brackets (from 5 to 4) and tax rates (the top
marginal tax rates were reduced from 45% to 43%). The family allowance was also increased (e.g.
for a taxpayer with 2 children, one of them below age 3, by close to e5,000) and was redefined as
a general income tax credit instead of a deduction. Three other important changes were a raise
in savings tax rates (from 15% to 18%), a reshuffling of tax bases, which moved many capital
2.2 Recent Reforms of the Personal Income Tax (2002-2015)
The Spanish PIT has undergone several changes during recent years. In general, the taxes are
reduced and increased in line with the economic expansions and downturns. The economic expan-
sion of the early 2000s resulted in several tax cuts between 2003 and 2007. Furthermore, right at
the start of the economic crisis in 2008, additional cuts were implemented in order to stimulate
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income items to the savings schedule, and the introduction of a tax credit of e2,500 on births and
adoptions. In 2008, a e400 tax credit for labor and self-employment income earners was introduced
in order to spur private expenditure. Furthermore, a non-refundable tax credit for house renters
was also implemented.
Between 2010 and 2012, the successive governments increased taxes or reduced deductions and
credits in the context of the economic crisis and the deterioration of the budget balance. In 2010
the e400 tax benefit was eliminated and the savings tax rates were increased (from 18% to 21%
for taxpayers earning more than e6,000 of savings income). In 2011 the tax credit on births and
adoptions was eliminated and the top marginal tax rates were increased from 43% to a range of
44.9% to 49%, depending on the region. In 2012 the government approved a significant increase
of marginal rates, which affected the entire tax schedule (for instance, the top marginal rates were
increased by 7 percentage points). This tax increase, which was initially intended to last for two
years, was later extended until 2014. Furthermore, a deduction associated to house purchases was
eliminated in 2013.
After the crisis, the government adopted a big reform. It consisted in a reduction of tax brackets
and tax rates, which overturned partly the 2012 tax raise, and resulted in the tax system outlined
in Figure 2. Also, the family allowance was increased, and a set of new refundable tax credits that
depend on family characteristics were introduced (such as the one accruing to large families).
3 Data
3.1 Micro data on Tax Returns (2002-2015)
We use an administrative dataset containing a (stratified) random sample of tax returns, which
includes almost the complete set of fiscal and socio-demographic information taxpayers provide
in their returns. Hence, the dataset provides a very detailed account of income from different
sources, tax benefits, tax liabilities and household characteristics (number of dependent relatives,
disability, location, etc.). The income and taxes paid are not censored either at the bottom or at
the top of the distribution.
The unit of observation in the dataset is a tax return, which can be of two types: single or
joint. As mentioned, single tax returns are filed at the individual level, whereas joint tax returns
represent two spouses filing together, or single-parent families with at least one child. In joint tax
returns incomes are pooled together and taxpayers are entitled to an additional tax deduction on
top of those accruing to single filings (see Figure 1). Other than this additional deduction, the
computation of tax liabilities under both types of filing is almost identical. The filing status is
chosen by the taxpayer. In general, joint tax returns benefit couples in which one partner earns
little or no income, as well as single-parent families with dependent children.18
18In 2015, single tax returns accounted for close to 80% of the total, while the remaining were joint tax returns.
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The dataset has both a cross-section and panel component.19 Repeated cross-sections are
available from 2002 to 2015, and they have a large sample size. The 2015 cross-section, for
example, contains 2.7 million observations, which is around 14% of the universe of tax returns.
For 2007-2010 and 2002-2006 periods, the sample size equals around 10% and 5% of the population,
respectively. In these repeated cross-sections, it is not possible to match household members, e.g.
to match a husband and wife who file two independent single tax returns. As a result, it is not
possible to study taxes at the household level.
The panel dataset covers the period 1999-2013 and has a smaller sample size (around 3.2%
of the universe of taxpayers in 2013). The main advantage of the panel is that it is possible to
match spouses who file single tax returns. Therefore, it is possible to compute total taxes paid
by households. Furthermore, computing incomes and taxes at the household level allows us to
compare the household income distribution from tax data with that obtained from survey data,
such as the EFF. Below we use the cross-section and the panel data to describe and estimate the
tax functions for individual taxpayers and households, respectively.
Table 2 provides a comparison between the cross-section sample aggregates in 2015 and their
population. The data provides a very accurate representation of income and tax liabilities of the
19.5 million tax return filers, the differences being less than 1% on the selected items, except for
gross income reported by the self-employed, for which the discrepancy is larger.
Table 2
Accuracy of the 2015
Cross-Section Data (eBillion)
Sample
Aggregate
Population
Aggregate
Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Taxpayers (million) 19.5 19.5 0.0%
Gross Labor Income 394.1 393.3 0.2%
Gross Capital Income 46.3 46.6 -0.8%
Gross Self-Employment Income 25.8 26.5 -2.6%
Taxable Income 374.7 375.0 -0.1%
Tax Liabilities 65.5 65.6 -0.2%
Notes: The source of the population aggregates is the Spanish Tax Agency (Es-
tad´ısticas de los declarantes del Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas F´ısicas
(IRPF), available at https://goo.gl/yAhF63). The definitions of the variables
are described in Section 3.2. Gross capital income excludes some small items for
which no population aggregates are reported.
19The datasets are named Muestra IRPF IEF-AEAT (Declarantes) and Panel IRPF 1999/2013 IEF-AEAT
(Declarantes). They are administered by the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (http://www.ief.es/), a research institute
within the Ministry of Finance and Civil Service. A detailed description (in Spanish) and some statistics are provided
every year in the working paper series of the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (https://goo.gl/1Nyota). For example,
see Pe´rez Lo´pez et al. (2018) for a description of the 2015 cross-section wave.
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and tax benefits, and the computation of effective average and marginal tax rates.
We use three income definitions. First, gross income is the sum of labor, capital, and self-
employment income. Labor income comprises benefits in cash and in kind granted to individuals as
employees. Capital income includes both financial income (interests, dividends, capital gains, etc.)
and real-estate income. Self-employment income corresponds to the earnings of the self-employed
associated to their businesses.20 It is important to note that gross self-employment income and
part of gross capital income are reported in the dataset net of some deductible expenses and tax
deductions. Since we do not observe these deductions, what we call gross income is less than actual
pre-tax income for these categories. This can be particularly important for the self-employed, as
such deductions can be relatively high, which may lead to an underestimation of their income. For
this reason, we also provide a second definition of income, adjusted gross income, where all income
categories are net of deductible expenses. The third income category is taxable income, which
corresponds to income subject to the application of the (general and savings) tax schedules. Note
that we define also the general and savings taxable incomes, to which the corresponding general
and savings tax schedules are applied.
Tax benefits can be of two types: tax deductions and tax credits. Tax deductions are amounts
subtracted directly from the tax base, before the application of the tax schedules. Therefore, total
tax deductions are equal to gross income minus taxable income. Tax credits, on the other hand,
are amounts subtracted from the tax liabilities. Hence, they represent the difference between the
3.2 Definitions and Sample Restrictions
20It also includes any income of employees (wage and salary earners) who set up an economic activity to generate
income.
amount that is calculated by the application of the tax schedule to taxable income and the final
tax liabilities. Tax liabilities correspond to the amount that the taxpayer effectively has to pay, i.e.
they are net of all, refundable or non-refundable, tax credits. As a result, they can be negative.
The average effective tax rates are computed as tax liabilities over gross income.21 We also
define the average effective general tax rate as tax liabilities resulting from the application of the
21If the tax liabilities are non-positive, then we set the tax rate to zero. Note that we could also compute tax
rates as the ratio of tax liabilities to adjusted gross income. We favor the broader definition of income to compute
average tax rates and total tax deductions.
general tax schedule net of the family allowance (the box Gross Tax Liabilities 1 in Figure 1) over
general income. We subtract the family allowance because for many (low income) taxpayers, this
is equal to the general taxable income, hence by subtracting it from the numerator we avoid an
artificial overestimation of the general tax rate (for these taxpayers the resulting average general tax
In this section we explain in detail the definition of the main variables used in the paper. Specifi-
cally, we describe the different income types we account for, the characterization of tax liabilities
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rate is zero). Average savings tax rates are computed similarly.22 Finally, the statutory marginal
tax rates for a particular income level (or income window) are calculated as the average of the
marginal rates of general and savings income, weighted by the corresponding income shares. We
also calculate effective marginal tax rates as the change in tax liabilities that result from marginal
changes in gross income.23
In all calculations we restrict the sample to taxpayers with positive total gross income, non-
negative gross income from different sources (labor, capital and self-employment), and average tax
rates below the maximum statutory marginal tax rate. We do not restrict the sample by the age
of the taxpayer. These restrictions only affect about 3% of all taxpayers in the sample.24
3.3 Survey of Household Finances
As mentioned above, we compare the estimated household income distribution from the tax return
data with that obtained from the Survey of Household Finances. The EFF is a survey conducted by
the Bank of Spain that collects information on socio-economic characteristics, income, assets, debts
and spending of around 6,000 households in each wave. Moreover, the survey oversamples high-
wealth households, in order to allow for a sufficient number of observations to study the financial
behavior at the top of the wealth distribution and to accurately measure aggregate wealth. The
EFF is undertaken every three years, the first wave was in 2002 and the last one in 2014. Each
wave accounts for annual income pertaining to the previous year. A detailed description of the
survey can be found in Bover et al. (2018).
Note that households in the tax data are defined as the taxpayer and their spouse, i.e. excluding
other members of the household filing a tax return. Therefore, in order to compare the income
aggregates between the tax and the survey data, we construct two household definitions in the
EFF. The first is denoted “fiscal household” and adds up the gross income of the household’s
reference person and their spouse. Note that the EFF provides information for each household
member on labor and self-employment income items. The capital income items are, however,
22According to the 2015 tax code, the boxes (in Modelo 100 ) corresponding to each definition are the following.
Gross income: 10 (labor) + 33 + 43 + 70 + 71 + 212 + 213 + 214 + 215 + 216 + 235 + 240 + 244 + 250 + 366
+ 370 (capital) + 125 + 150 + 180 (self-employment). Adjusted gross income: 22 (labor) + 37 + 47 + 70 + 71 +
212 + 213 + 214 + 215 + 216 + 235 + 240 + 244 + 250 + 366 - 376 - 379 - 378 + 370 - 382 - 383 - 384 - 385 - 387
- 388 - 389 - 390 (capital) + 125 + 150 + 180 (self-employment). Taxable income: 440 (general) + 445 (savings).
General income: 10 + 43 + 70 + 71 + 125 + 150 + 180 + 212 + 215 + 216 + 235 + 240 + 244 + 250 + 366.
Savings income: 33 + 213 + 214 + 370. Tax liabilities: 532 - 546 - 557 - 572 - 588 - 590. Average effective general
tax rate: 476 + 477general income . Average effective savings tax rate:
484 + 485
savings income .
23Specifically, we follow Guner et al. (2014), Section 6. For each income level y0, represented as a ratio of income
over mean income, the marginal tax rate is approximated as the average of the variation in tax liabilities when
income increases to y0 + Δy and when income decreases to y0 −Δy, with Δy = 0.4. Below we compute effective
marginal rates from income levels ranging 0.2 to 9.8 in steps of 0.4.
24Table A.1 in the online appendix shows that the average income and other characteristics of the restricted
sample do not differ significantly from those of the universe of taxpayers.
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25Note that since we focus on aggregate household income, it is irrelevant for two-person households to assign
capital income to the reference person, their partner, or to split it between the two.
26According to the 2014 EFF wave, we define gross income as:
∑
i (p6 64 i + p6 66 i + p6 68 i p6 70 + p6 74b i
+ p6 74 i) + p6 75d1 + p6 75d3 + p6 75d4 (labor) +
∑
ip6 72 i (self-employment) + p7 2 + p7 10 + p7 12
+ p7 12a + p7 14 + p7 4a + p7 4b + p7 6a + p7 6b + p7 8a + p7 8b + p6 76b + p6 75f (capital), where i
indexes each household member (the reference person and their spouse in two-person households and the former in
one-person households).
27Notice that under the two household definitions we impose this rule on the added income of the reference
person and their spouse. Additionally, for the case of “whole households” we apply the restriction on each household
member. Hence, if he/she does not fulfill the restriction, it is excluded from the household.
person).25 Note also that we classify the income sources provided by the EFF so as to mimic the
labor, capital and self-employment groups defined in the tax data.26 Second, we construct a larger
household definition encompassing all the household members, which we denote by the term “whole
household”.
As with the tax data, we restrict the sample to households earning positive gross income and
non-negative gross income from all sources (labor, capital and self-employment).27 This amounts
to dropping around 2% of the households.
4 Basic Facts of the Income and Tax Distributions
In this section we report basic facts on income, tax liabilities, and tax benefits for samples of
individuals in 2015 and households in 2013. Moreover, we compare the results for the households
with those obtained from the EFF.
reported for the whole household. We assume that all capital income belongs to the household’s
reference person (even if a particular asset could belong, e.g., to an elderly living with the reference
4.1 Income Distribution
4.1.1 Individuals
Table 3 summarizes how different notions of income are distributed among individuals in 2015.
The inequality in gross incomes is significant. The top quintile accounts for about 47.1% of total
gross income, while the bottom quintile’s share is only 4.6%, a ratio of 10 to 1. The income share
of the top 1%, a popular measure of income inequality, is about 9.5%. This is lower than other big
euro area countries, such as Germany (11.1%) and France (10.8%), and it is much smaller than
what we observe in Anglo-Saxon economies (12.8% in the UK and 20.2% in the US). Nevertheless,
it is higher than the top 1% income share in Scandinavian countries (for example, Sweden is 8.8%
and Norway is 8.5%) and in Italy (7.3%).28
28The numbers are from the World Inequality Database (https://wid.world/) for the year 2015, except for France
and the US, whose data pertain to 2014. For an analysis of top incomes in Spain, see Alvaredo and Saez (2014).
Mart´ınez-Toledano (2017) provides estimates on the concentration of wealth in Spain.
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income share of the top 1% and the Gini coefficient increase as we move from gross to taxable
income. This is not surprising, since most of the taxes are paid by richer households. Indeed, for
many taxpayers at the bottom quintile (about 20% of them), taxable income becomes zero once
deductions are applied to their gross income.
Finally, columns (4) to (6) of Table 3 show the distribution of income from different income
sources. The capital and self-employment income are much more unequally distributed than the
labor income. The capital income renders a higher degree of concentration at the bottom and top
quintiles, when compared to gross income. For example, the bottom 20% accounts for just 4.6%
of gross income, while it accumulates 5.4% of capital income; the top 1% accumulating 9.5% and
32.7%, respectively. Self-employment income is also concentrated at the very top, but the lower
end of the income distribution accumulates a substantial amount as well.
Table 3
Distribution of Individual Income and Income Sources (2015)
Quantiles Income Definition Gross Income Sources
Gross
Income
Adjusted
Gross
Income
Taxable
Income
Labor
Income
Capital
Income
Self-
employment
Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
1-5% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.9% 0.8%
5-10% 1.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.9% 1.4% 2.2%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 4.6% 2.0% 2.0% 4.2% 5.4% 8.1%
2nd (20-40%) 10.2% 7.9% 7.9% 10.3% 7.8% 13.5%
3rd (40-60%) 15.5% 15.6% 15.3% 16.2% 10.0% 14.7%
4th (60-80%) 22.7% 23.6% 23.4% 24.4% 12.9% 14.5%
5th (80-100%) 47.1% 51.0% 51.4% 44.9% 63.9% 49.3%
Top
90-95% 10.1% 10.8% 10.8% 10.5% 8.2% 7.4%
95-99% 11.9% 13.0% 13.1% 11.6% 13.8% 14.0%
1% 9.5% 10.7% 11.1% 6.0% 32.7% 19.7%
Other statistics
Gini coefficient 0.42 0.49 0.50 0.45 0.89 0.96
Var - log income 1.14 3.05 2.97 0.82 8.33 3.62
P90/P10 7.31 19.20 19.19 7.02 1256.43 112.33
P50/P10 3.15 7.81 7.66 3.11 96.67 21.59
P90/P50 2.32 2.46 2.51 2.26 13.00 5.20
Notes: This table displays the distribution of gross income, adjusted gross income and taxable income, as
well as the distribution of gross income sources (labor, capital, and self-employment) for the sample of 2015
individuals. The Gini coefficient in columns (4) to (6) are computed including the observations with zero
income, while the percentile ratios of those columns exclude them.
When we move to adjusted and taxable incomes in Table 3, the share of higher quintiles
increases. For example, the share of income accounted for the top 20% increases from 47.1% of
gross income, to 51.0% of adjusted gross income and 51.4% of taxable income. Likewise, both the
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Table 4 presents another look at the income distribution in the data. For gross income, it
reports the income cutoffs for different percentiles of the distribution (column 1). It also reports
average gross incomes and average incomes from different sources at different points of the income
income of the top 95-99% of taxpayers is just e5,000.29, 30
In Table 5 we decompose the sources of income across the income distribution. As columns
(1) to (3) show, labor income is by far the largest source of income. Its importance increases
monotonically from quintiles 1 to 4, where it represents between 80% and 90% of total income. In
distribution (columns 2 to 5). It is worth noticing that there is only a small number of taxpayers
that report relatively large incomes in their tax returns, which would put them in higher income
brackets (see Figure 2). Average individual gross income in the data is about e24,000. Hence,
80% of households report gross incomes that are below the mean gross income. Indeed, 99%
of taxpayers report total gross income below e105,000 (about 5 times the mean income). Also,
columns (2) to (5) show that average income levels across income sources are low. For instance, the
top 1% earns on average slightly above e120,000 of labor income, while average self-employment
29Note that self-employment income is net of deductible expenses associated to the business activity, see Section
3.2. As a result, the figures might underestimate the actual pre-tax income from self-employment.
30As we document in Tables A.2 and A.3 in online Appendix A, Tables 3 and 4 change very slightly if we restrict
the sample to ages 16-64, and, as a result, eliminate retired taxpayers who might potentially have low incomes. The
threshold for the top 1% of labor income earners, for example, increases to e132,948.
Table 4
Individual Gross Income Cutoffs
and Average Income Levels (e, 2015)
Quantiles Cutoffs Average Income
Gross
Income
Gross
Income
Labor
Income
Capital
Income
Self-
employment
Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bottom
1% 0 107 17 84 7
1-5% 310 1,809 971 546 292
5-10% 3,401 4,825 3,522 662 642
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 0 5,543 4,312 651 579
2nd (20-40%) 9,508 12,388 10,483 937 968
3rd (40-60%) 15,383 18,806 16,553 1,202 1,052
4th (60-80%) 22,673 27,581 24,983 1,560 1,038
5th (80-100%) 33,735 57,143 45,907 7,698 3,538
Top
90-95% 43,410 48,960 42,900 3,929 2,131
95-99% 56,971 72,402 59,065 8,319 5,018
1% 105,473 229,741 122,572 78,899 28,270
Notes: This table displays the gross income cutoffs as well as the average of gross income
sources across the gross income distribution according to the 2015 sample of taxpayers.
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Table 5
Individual Gross Income Sources (2015)
Quantiles Labor, Capital & Self-Employment General & Savings
Labor
Income
Capital
Income
Self-
employment
Income
General
Income
Savings
Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bottom
1% 10.2% 85.6% 4.3% 43.1% 57.0%
1-5% 47.7% 37.3% 15.0% 85.5% 14.5%
5-10% 72.3% 14.1% 13.6% 94.7% 5.3%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 68.6% 20.1% 11.3% 95.1% 4.9%
2nd (20-40%) 84.6% 7.7% 7.8% 97.0% 3.0%
3rd (40-60%) 88.0% 6.4% 5.6% 97.4% 2.6%
4th (60-80%) 90.6% 5.7% 3.8% 97.4% 2.6%
5th (80-100%) 87.1% 8.4% 4.6% 90.2% 9.8%
Top
90-95% 87.7% 8.0% 4.3% 95.5% 4.5%
95-99% 82.1% 11.2% 6.7% 92.9% 7.1%
1% 63.2% 24.1% 12.7% 69.9% 30.1%
Notes: This table shows the decomposition of gross income over income sources across the gross
income distribution. Columns (1) to (3) depict the decomposition between labor, capital and
self-employment income, whereas columns (4) and (5) shows the decomposition of gross income
between general and savings income. Note that columns (1) to (3) and columns (4) to (5) add
up to 100.
for 7.8% of gross income in the second quintile, while it drops to around 4% to 6% for richer
individuals. At the top of the distribution it accounts for slightly more than 12% of total income.
In columns (4) and (5) we show the decomposition of gross income between general and savings
income. While general income is by far the largest income source, for taxpayers in the top 1%
income taxed under the savings scale is significant, reaching on aggregate 30% of total income.
4.1.2 Households
In Table 6 we compare the household income distribution in 2013 computed from the tax data
and from the EFF. Regarding the latter, the column (2) depicts the income distribution under the
fiscal household definition (the household head and their spouse), whereas the column (4) shows
the distribution under the whole household definition (all the household members). We find that
the EFF and the tax data provide very similar estimates of the income distribution, especially if
the top decile income from labor is less important; although even for the top 1% the share of labor
income is very high, close to 65%. In the lowest end of the distribution, especially in the bottom
1%, capital income appears very significant, although this reflects the very low income levels of
this group (see Table 4). Excluding the lowest quintile, capital income accounts for around 6% to
9% of gross income, reaching 24.1% for the richest taxpayers. Self-employment income accounts
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between the tax and the survey data tend be larger.
4.2 Tax Rates and Tax Liabilities
In Table 7 we summarize the distribution of tax liabilities and tax rates. In columns (1) and (2) we
also depict the corresponding distributions of gross income and taxable income (already shown in
Table 3), in order to illustrate the progressivity of the tax code. While the top quintile accounts for
47.1% of gross income, it pays around 73% of total tax liabilities. Similarly, the top 1% accounts
Table 6
Household Income Distribution: Tax Data Compared to EFF (2013)
Quantiles Tax Data EFF Fiscal
Household
EFF Whole
Household
(1) (2) (3)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
1-5% 0.3% 0.7% 0.7%
5-10% 1.0% 1.2% 1.2%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 4.4% 4.9% 5.1%
2nd (20-40%) 9.6% 9.4% 9.7%
3rd (40-60%) 14.5% 14.5% 15.4%
4th (60-80%) 21.7% 22.7% 22.6%
5th (80-100%) 49.9% 48.5% 47.3%
Top
90-95% 11.0% 11.0% 10.8%
95-99% 13.2% 13.0% 12.5%
1% 9.7% 8.0% 7.6%
Other statistics
Gini coefficient 0.45 0.44 0.42
Var - log income 1.10 0.70 0.66
P90/P10 7.89 7.48 7.01
P50/P10 3.00 2.73 2.73
P90/P50 2.63 2.74 2.56
Notes: This table depicts the 2013 household income distribution according to the
tax return data (aggregated at the household level) and the Survey of Household
Finances (EFF). Households in the latter are defined in two ways. First, fiscal
household, comprising the household head and their partner. Second, the whole
household, including all the household members.
at the top of the income distribution. For example, the EFF seems to under predict the share of
income accruing to the top 1% by 1.7 percentage points. If one focuses on the income accruing
to all household members (whole household definition), depicted in column (4), the differences
one focuses on the fiscal household definition of the EFF. For example, income of the top 20%
amounts to around 50% in both the tax and the survey data, while the bottom 20% receives around
5% of earnings. In general, the discrepancies between the tax and the survey data tend to be larger
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The high concentration of tax liabilities is reflected in the small average tax rates at the lower
end of the income distribution and the larger rates at the upper end, which average 19.0% in the
top quintile and 30.6% in the top 1%. Average statutory marginal tax rates are also highest for
richer individuals, reaching almost 40% for the top 1%, while they are significantly lower as we
move down the income distribution.
These averages hide a substantial degree of heterogeneity across individuals. Panel A of Figure
3 depicts the average effective tax rates across different multiples of mean gross income, together
18
with 2 standard error bands.31 As can be seen, there is wide variation of tax rates even for
individuals with the same gross income, being this the result of different family characteristics and
tax benefit entitlements. The shape of this curve is what the parametric estimates of Section 5
are meant to approximate.32
In panel B of Figure 3 we represent the corresponding curves of statutory and effective marginal
tax rates. The figure shows that marginal rates increase rapidly with income, but stabilize at
31Note that mean individual gross income in 2015 was e24,291, while household mean income in 2013 amounted
to e30,839.
32Figure A.1 in the online appendix shows that median tax levels are almost identical to mean tax levels up to
4 times mean income (about e100,000) and slightly higher above that.
Table 7
Distribution of Individual Tax Liabilities and Tax Rates (2015)
Quantiles Gross
Income
Taxable
Income
Tax
Liabilities
Average
Tax Rate
Statutory
Marginal
Tax Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.0%
1-5% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.9%
5-10% 1.0% 0.3% -0.1% 0.0% 8.1%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 4.6% 2.0% -0.2% 0.1% 12.9%
2nd (20-40%) 10.2% 7.9% 0.7% 1.3% 20.3%
3rd (40-60%) 15.5% 15.3% 7.0% 6.4% 23.4%
4th (60-80%) 22.7% 23.4% 19.4% 11.8% 27.8%
5th (80-100%) 47.1% 51.4% 73.2% 19.0% 34.5%
Top
90-95% 10.1% 10.8% 13.8% 19.0% 35.5%
95-99% 11.9% 13.1% 20.6% 23.8% 39.5%
1% 9.5% 11.1% 21.0% 30.6% 39.9%
Notes: This table shows the distribution of individual tax liabilities (column 3), average effective
tax rates (column 4) and statutory marginal tax rates (column 5) across the gross income
distribution. In columns (1) and (2) the distribution of gross income and taxable income are
summarized in order to highlight the progressivity of the tax code.
for 9.5% of gross income, but pays about 21% of total taxes. As a matter of fact, close to 93%
of tax payments are concentrated in the top 40%, while the bottom two deciles account for only
0.5% of the tax.
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around 3 times mean income (e75,000) and start to decline linearly at a slow rate. The set of tax
benefits renders the effective curve below the statutory one, being the difference roughly about 4
percentage points on average.
Figure 4 highlights two key features of the distribution of tax liabilities and taxes in Spain.
First, a significant share of individuals face a zero effective tax rate, around 37% of all taxpayers
in 2015. The panel A shows that until about 45% of mean income (e11,000), the percentage of
taxpayers facing positive rates is only about 10%. The share increases steeply afterward, and by
90% of mean income (e22,000) more than 90% of taxpayers pay taxes, with the share of positive
tax liabilities converging to 100% as income increases. As we detail below, this feature of the tax
will be important in the parametric estimates of effective tax functions. Second, most taxpayers
are concentrated on relatively low income levels. The panel B of Figure 4 shows the share of tax
returns in each income bin and the effective tax curve already plotted in panel A of Figure 3.
While the effective tax rates increase from 0 to about 30%, most taxpayers face much lower rates.
For about 75% of all taxpayers, the effective tax rates are below 15% (the sum of the first 3 bars in
Figure 4). As a result, while most discussion on tax increases and tax cuts focus on top marginal
rates, for a great majority of households, the relevant tax rates are much lower.33
Figure 3
Individual Effective Average and Marginal Tax Rates (2015)
Panel A: Effective Average Tax Rates
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Notes: Panel A depicts the 2015 effective average tax rate (± 2 standard deviations) across different multiples of mean income. Each
data point corresponds to the mean average tax rate of taxpayers whose income is larger than or equal to the point in the x-axis and
less than the next point. For instance, the data point of mean income 1.4 is the mean average tax rate of taxpayers earning income
within the interval [1.4,1.8). For the last point (9.8), the tax rate is calculated for incomes between 9.8 and 10.2 of mean income. Panel
B shows the statutory and effective marginal tax rates. Statutory rates are computed as the weighted average of general and savings
marginal rates (gross of the family tax credit), while effective rates are computed as explained in footnote 23.
4.3 Tax Benefits (Deductions and Credits)
We next turn to the distribution of tax benefits. In Table 8 we describe the distribution of the
most important tax deductions, which, as we mentioned in Section 3.2, are tax benefits that reduce
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Panel A: Share of Positive Effective Tax Rates
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Notes: The panel A plots the share of taxpayers facing effective positive tax rates in each income bin. The panel B depicts the 2015
mean effective average tax rates and the share of taxpayers across bins of mean income.
deductions for taxpayers at different points in the income distribution as well as for all taxpayers
33See Guner et al. (2018) for a quantitative analysis of how higher tax rates on top incomes affect the total tax
collection in Spain.
(the last row). When we consider the aggregate, the most important tax deduction is the one
granted to labor income earners, which accounts for about 63% of total deductions. It is followed
by social security contributions paid by the employees (20%), the tax benefit associated to joint
tax returns (10%), and the contributions to private pension plans (4%). There are, however,
differences in the importance of these deductions along the income distribution. For instance, the
deduction for contributions to private pension plans accounts for 27% of all tax deductions for the
top 1% of taxpayers, while it represents less than 2% for the first two quintiles.34
The top quintile benefits from more than 25% of the total tax deductions, while the bottom
quintile receives around 16% (see the first column of Table 8). This reflects the fact that two
important deductions, those associated with private pension plans and social security contribu-
tions, benefit mostly the top two quintiles. The top quintile, for example, got 71.5% of benefits
associated with private pensions and 41% of benefits associated with social security contributions.
Furthermore, the tax base of many low income earners goes to zero after making use of some tax
benefits, hence exhausting the possibility of further deductions.
34Ayuso et al. (forthcoming) estimate the savings effect of the introduction of this deduction in 1988. They show
that when this policy was introduced, most contributions to pension funds were made by older and high income
individuals, who had the largest marginal potential gains. Since 1988 the policy become very popular. In 2015,
close to 15% of taxpayers had some contribution to pension plans.
from the tax liabilities. Table 9 depicts their distribution across income groups and Table A.5 in
Tax credits, as mentioned in Section 3.2, correspond to tax benefits that are subtracted directly
directly the tax base. Table A.4 in the online appendix documents the importance of different
Figure 4
Effective Tax Rates along the Income Distribution
(Individuals, 2015)
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Table 8
Distribution of Individual Tax Deductions (2015)
Quantiles Total Social
Security
Contribu-
tions
Labor
Income
Joint
Filing
Contribu-
tions to
Private
Pensions
Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
1-5% 1.0% 0.2% 1.3% 0.9% 0.2% 0.6%
5-10% 3.9% 0.7% 6.0% 1.2% 0.4% 0.8%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 16.1% 3.7% 24.5% 6.0% 1.6% 2.8%
2nd (20-40%) 23.5% 10.8% 31.6% 18.4% 3.9% 4.7%
3rd (40-60%) 16.9% 18.7% 15.1% 27.2% 7.8% 8.9%
4th (60-80%) 18.3% 26.1% 14.5% 25.4% 15.1% 15.5%
5th (80-100%) 25.2% 40.7% 14.2% 23.0% 71.5% 68.0%
Top
90-95% 6.2% 11.6% 3.5% 5.4% 16.6% 7.9%
95-99% 6.1% 10.2% 2.8% 4.3% 27.2% 14.9%
1% 2.5% 2.4% 0.6% 1.1% 12.5% 32.7%
Notes: This table shows the distribution of tax deductions over the gross income distribution. Tax deductions
are amounts subtracted from the tax base. Total tax deductions are computed as gross income minus taxable
income, where the latter refers to income to which the tax schedule is applied.
Table 9
Distribution of Individual Tax Credits (2015)
Quantiles Total Family
Allowance
House
Purchases
Employed
Mothers
Large
Families
Regional Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1%
1-5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 1.1% 2.0% 0.0% 0.4%
5-10% 0.9% 0.9% 0.0% 2.2% 3.6% 0.0% 0.7%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 4.9% 5.3% 0.7% 10.7% 12.2% 0.4% 2.0%
2nd (20-40%) 16.5% 18.1% 7.1% 22.3% 15.4% 11.7% 3.1%
3rd (40-60%) 24.8% 25.1% 22.8% 23.5% 20.3% 37.4% 21.1%
4th (60-80%) 25.8% 25.7% 29.7% 24.5% 19.6% 32.9% 18.2%
5th (80-100%) 28.0% 25.7% 39.7% 19.0% 32.5% 17.7% 55.6%
Top
90-95% 6.9% 6.4% 10.4% 4.7% 8.3% 4.5% 9.7%
95-99% 5.8% 5.1% 9.7% 3.1% 8.8% 3.7% 11.7%
1% 2.2% 1.3% 2.4% 0.5% 3.3% 0.9% 22.3%
Notes: This table characterizes the distribution of tax credits across income groups. Tax credits are amounts that directly
reduce tax liabilities. Total tax credits are computed as the difference between tax liabilities following the application of
the tax schedule and final tax liabilities.
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5 Parametric Estimates
In this section we present the estimated effective average tax functions. We proceed as follows.
First, we show the estimates of the average and marginal tax rate functions for individuals in
2015. Second, we present an alternative approach and estimate separate parametric functions
35The tax credit associated to house purchases was stopped in 2013, so that it only benefits transactions carried
out before that year.
for the different components of income (general income and savings income), as well as for tax
credits, which we refer to as the three-function approach. Most of our analysis focuses on single tax
functions that map gross incomes to tax liabilities. Besides its simplicity, this approach provides
estimates that can be compared with available estimates for other countries. Furthermore, division
of general and savings income in Spanish tax code do not easily lend itself to notions of capital and
labor income in macro models, since some forms of capital income. e.g. rents from real estates,
are lumped together with more standard forms of labor income.
Third, we present an evaluation of all the estimated functions by their capacity to predict the
amount and the distribution of tax liabilities. Fourth, we account for changes in taxes over time
by providing estimates of the tax functions for individuals between 2002 and 2015. Finally, we
estimate functions for households in 2013.
5.1 Effective Tax Functions of Individuals in 2015
In order to account for the fact that a significant number of Spanish taxpayers face a zero tax rate
(panel A of Figure 4), we estimate:
t(I˜) =
⎧⎨⎩ 0 if I˜ < I¯,f(I˜) if I˜ ≥ I¯ , (1)
where t is the average tax rate, I˜ stands for multiples of mean gross income, I¯ is the income
threshold, chosen so as to minimize the mean squared error, and f(I˜) is a parsimonious non-linear
the online appendix shows their relative importance for different income groups. By far the family
allowance is the largest tax credit, representing more than 95% of these benefits for the bottom
20% and more than 80% for the top 20%. Next is the tax credit associated to house purchases,
that granted to employed mothers, large families, and a battery of region-specific tax credits.35
As for the distribution of these benefits, the family allowance is evenly distributed, since it
depends solely on family characteristics. Note that the smaller share accruing to the lower end of
the income distribution is explained by the exhaustion of tax liabilities as a result of the application
of (part of) this allowance. On the contrary, the tax credits associated to house purchases and
large families benefit the richer individuals, whereas benefits granted to employed mothers and the
set of region-specific benefits goes mainly to the middle of the income distribution.
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In panel A of Figure 5 we plot the estimated average tax rates resulting from the specifications
together with the data. The observed average tax rates show a steep increase at lower income
levels and then flatten out at the right-end of the income distribution. Using the OECD tax and
benefit calculator, Holter et al. (2018) estimate HSV effective tax functions for a group of OECD
countries. Their estimate of τ for Spain is 0.148 (close to our estimate in Table 10). Their results
imply higher levels of τ , i.e. higher degrees of progressivity, for most European countries, e.g. 0.18
for Italy, 0.2 for the UK, 0.22 for Germany and Sweden, and 0.26 for Denmark.39
From equation (2), the marginal tax rate of the HSV specification is given by:
m(I˜) = 1− λ(1− τ)I˜−τ , (4)
while from equation (3) we can derive the marginal tax rate function of the GS specification as:
m(I) = b[1− (sIp + 1)−1/p−1]. (5)
39For the OECD tax and benefit calculator, see: http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benets-and-wages/tax-benet-
webcalculator/.
high degree of precision. The income cutoffs are estimated between 49% and 55% of mean income
for individuals in 2015, and between 36% and 42% of mean income for households in 2013.
36In the HSV specification, λ determines the average taxes while τ determines the progressivity. When τ = 0,
taxes are flat and equal to 1− λ. When τ > 0, taxes are positive, and higher levels of τ imply a greater degree of
progressivity.
37Guner et al. (2014) consider also two other specifications: a log specification (f(I˜) = α + βlog(I˜)) and a
power specification (f(I˜) = δ + γI˜). These functions perform worse for the Spanish data than the HSV and GS
specifications. The estimates are available upon request.
38These functions are estimated by NLS. Following Guner et al. (2014), we divide I by 1,000 when estimating the
GS function. Figure A.2 in the online appendix shows the mean squared error of the HSV and GS specifications,
as a function of I¯.
function. Following Guner et al. (2014), we consider two possible specifications of f : The HSV
specification, used by Benabou (2002) and Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017):36
f(I˜) = 1− λ(I˜)−τ , (2)
and the GS specification, used in Gouveia and Strauss (1994):
f(I) = b
[
1− (sIp + 1)− 1p ]. (3)
Note that in this case I˜ is replaced by I, i.e. by the income level.37
Table 10 shows the parameter estimates.38 In general, the parameters are estimated with a
Using the parametric estimates depicted in Table 10, the panel B of Figure 5 shows the resulting
marginal tax rate functions, as well as the data. The data for marginal tax rates correspond to
effective marginal tax rates. As mentioned in Section 4.2, effective marginal rates increase rapidly
and flatten out at a certain income level. This last feature is well accounted for by the shape of the
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Table 10
Parametric Estimates of the
Average Tax Functions
Functions Individuals
2015
Households
2013
(1) (2)
HSV
λ 0.8985 0.8823
(0.0000) (0.0001)
τ 0.1483 0.1224
(0.0001) (0.0001)
I¯ 49% 36%
MSE 0.0011271 0.0018442
GS
b 0.3356 0.3283
(0.0003) (0.0007)
s 0.0003 0.0019
(0.0000) (0.0000)
p 2.7340 1.8810
(0.0072) (0.0085)
I¯ 55% 42%
MSE 0.0011258 0.0018817
Notes: This table shows the parameter estimates of the effective average tax functions for
individuals in 2015 and for households in 2013. I¯ is the percentage of mean income below
which the effective taxes are estimated to be zero. Each column accounts for a different sample:
individuals in 2015 and households in 2013. MSE stands for mean squared error. Standard
errors are in parenthesis.
Figure 5
Effective Tax Functions (Individuals, 2015)
Panel A: Average Tax Rates
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Panel B: Marginal Tax Rates
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Notes: This figure plots the mean effective tax rates by income level as well as the predicted rates resulting from the estimated tax
functions (HSV and GS specifications). The panel A shows the effective average tax rates, whereas the panel B depicts the implied
marginal rate functions. Each data point corresponds to the mean tax rate of taxpayers whose income is larger than or equal to the
point in the x-axis and less than the next point. For the last point (9.8), the tax rate is calculated for incomes between 9.8 and 10.2 of
mean income. The tax rate functions are evaluated at the corresponding point in the x-axis. The parametric estimates of the average
tax rate functions can be found in the first column of Table 10. See section 4.2 for details on the computation of effective marginal
rates.
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GS function. On the other hand, marginal tax rates under this specification increase and flatten
too quickly compared to the data. At around 5 times mean income, the marginal tax rates are
33.5% under the GS specification, while they are 36.8% in the data. In contrast, for 1.5 times
mean income, the GS tax function overestimates the marginal tax rates by around 3.5 percentage
points. On the contrary, the HSV tax function captures the marginal tax rates very well up to 4
times mean income. After 4 times mean income, however, the marginal tax rates keep increasing
under the HSV function, while they are flat in the data. By 5 times mean income, for example,
the marginal tax rate under the HSV function is about 3 percentage points higher than the data.
Overall, the HSV function fits well the tax rates of the well-off, but it is unable to capture the
near constant marginal tax rates at very high income levels, which leads to an over estimation of
5.2 Three-function Approach
In this section we provide an alternative approach to parametrize the Spanish Personal Income
Tax. We estimate three different functions that connect income from different sources (general vs.
savings) to the tax liabilities. Specifically, we estimate a function that relates general income with
general tax rates; a second function that links the savings income to the savings tax rates; and a
third function that accounts for the amount of tax credits as a function of total gross income. In
this way, starting from gross income by income source, the final tax liabilities of the taxpayer can
be easily estimated by going through each of these functions. It must be noted that one advantage
of this three-function approach is that it allows simulating more detailed reforms, such as a change
in capital tax rates.
For the general tax rate function we pose the same functional form as in the effective tax
function estimated in Section 5.1, i.e. that described in equation (1). We follow this approach
given that the shape of general tax rates resembles that of effective tax rates. We estimate this
function under the two specifications HSV (equation 2) and GS (equation 3). Note that in this
case t stands for the average general tax rate, I˜ for multiples of mean general income and I for
the general income level.42
Regarding the savings tax rates (panel B of Figure 2), we estimate the following linear function
with a kink:
taxes paid by the very rich. On the contrary, the GS function tends to under estimate the average
tax rates, yet it captures very well the flattening out of tax rates.40, 41
40Regarding the tax functions of individuals by marital status, we found no remarkable differences between taxes
paid by single and married individuals, see Figure A.3 in the online appendix.
41As we show in online Appendix A and B, when we restrict the sample to taxpayers between ages 16-64, we get
very similar results, see Table A.6 and Figure A.4.
42Mean general income in 2015 was e22,805, whereas mean savings income was e1,486.
ts(I˜s) =
⎧⎨⎩ α + ζI˜s if I˜s < S¯,κ if I˜s ≥ S¯, (6)
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where ts is the average savings tax rate, I˜s stands for multiples of mean savings income, κ is the
sample mean of the savings tax rate if I˜s ≥ S¯ and S¯ is again chosen so as to minimize the MSE.
Finally, for the tax credit function, we follow Guner et al. (2017) and estimate the following
Ricker model:
c(I˜) = β0 + exp(β1)exp(β2I˜)I˜
β3 , (7)
where c stands for total tax credits as a fraction of gross income and I˜ refers to multiples of mean
gross income.43, 44
The three estimated functions are depicted in Figure 6, while the parametric estimates are
shown in Table 11. The panel A of the figure indicates that both the HSV and the GS specifications
43Note that total tax credits are computed net of the family allowance, since the latter is subsumed in the
computation of the general tax rate, see the definition thereof in Section 3.2. Also, note that the general tax rate
function and the tax credit function are estimated by NLS, while the savings tax rate function is estimated by OLS.
In the estimation of the tax credit functions, we exclude a few observations whose tax credits are larger than their
gross income.
44The second term in equation (7) is known as Ricker-function, after Ricker (1954).
Table 11
Parametric Estimates of the Tax Functions:
Three-function Approach (Individuals, 2015)
Parameters Individuals
2015
Parameters Individuals
2015
(1) (2)
General income tax rates (HSV) Savings income tax rates
λ 0.8919 α 0.1272
(0.0000) (0.0001)
τ 0.1581 ζ 0.0057
(0.0001) (0.0001)
I¯ 49% κ 0.2018
MSE 0.0008902 (0.0374)
S¯ 13.14
MSE 0.0076674
General income tax rates (GS) Tax credits
b 0.3893 β0 0.0085
(0.0004) (0.0000)
s 0.0015 β1 12.5683
(0.0000) (0.2572)
p 2.0366 β2 -17.5032
I¯ 58% β3 14.4012
(0.0041) (0.2610)
MSE 0.0009215 (0.2142)
MSE 0.0008593
Notes: This table shows the parameter estimates of the general income tax
function (for both the HSV and GS specifications), the savings income tax
function, and the tax credits function for individuals. I¯ stands for mean
general income below which tax rates are estimated to be zero, while S¯ is
the estimated kink of the savings tax function.
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5.3 Evaluation of Tax Functions
How well do these functions capture the level and the distribution of tax liabilities? In this section
we provide an assessment. In the first column of Table 12 we depict the distribution of tax
revenue by income quantile in the data. The remaining columns show the percentage deviation
of the estimates from the data. We can see that the tax functions approximate quite well total
capture well the shape of the general income tax function. In panel B, also, it becomes apparent
that the shape of the savings income tax function is well approximated by a piecewise functions of
the form estimated, where the tax rate increases linearly and flattens out at around 13 times mean
savings income. Finally, tax credits seem to benefit more, as a fraction of gross income, taxpayers
earning around mean income. From that point on, the incidence of tax credits diminishes until
it converges at around 0.62% of gross income. This shape is decently captured by the model
proposed, yet the tax credits of the right-end of the income distribution are overstated, see the
panel C.
Table 12
Evaluation of Tax Functions: Total Tax Liabilities in 2015
(% Difference with Respect to the Data)
One-function Three-function
Approach Approach
Quantiles Data (ebn) HSV GS HSV GS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bottom
1% 0.0 - - - -
1-5% 0.0 - - - -
5-10% 0.0 - - - -
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) -0.1 - - - -
2nd (20-40%) 0.4 50.4% 54.1% 14.8% 7.7%
3rd (40-60%) 4.5 7.3% 2.6% -2.3% -2.7%
4th (60-80%) 12.4 -0.3% -2.1% -0.6% -4.0%
5th (80-100%) 46.9 7.1% 0.6% 0.8% -1.0%
Top
90-95% 8.8 -0.4% 3.6% 1.4% 3.8%
95-99% 13.2 -2.0% -0.5% -1.8% 0.8%
1% 13.4 27.7% -1.5% 2.1% -8.2%
Total
Tax liabilities 64.0 6.2% 0.8% 0.5% -1.5%
Notes: This table shows the % difference across income groups of total tax liabilities estimated from
each tax function and the data. Columns (2) and (3) are based on tax functions estimated from final
tax liabilities, i.e. the one-function approach, see Section 5.1. Column (2) displays the results of the
HSV function, while column (3) is based on the GS function. In columns (4) and (5) we report the
results from the three-function approach. This entails estimating one function each for general income
tax rates, savings income tax rates and tax credits. In column (4) the general income function is the
HSV specification, whereas in column (5) it is the GS function. The savings income tax rates are
modeled by a linear function with a kink and tax credits are estimated as in Guner et al. (2017). See
Section 5.2 for more details.
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tax collection, except the HSV specification of the single-function approach, which tend to over
predict it. For example, both specifications in the three-function approach render a deviation of
less than 1.5%, while the GS function in the one-function approach underestimates total revenue
by less than 1%. As already observed in Figure 5, the fact that this function converged to a top
marginal tax rate below the one observed in the data leads to an under prediction of taxes paid
Figure 6
Parametric Functions: Three-Function Approach (Individuals, 2015)
Panel A: General Tax Rates
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Panel B: Savings Tax Rates
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
S
av
in
gs
 In
co
m
e 
A
ve
ra
ge
 T
ax
 R
at
es
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Multiples of Mean Savings Income
Data Linear with Kink
Panel C: Tax Credits
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Notes: This figure plots the estimation of the three parametric tax functions of the Spanish Personal Income Tax, namely, the average
general tax rate (panel A), the average savings tax rate (panel B) and tax credits as a fraction of gross income, see Section 5.2. Each
data point corresponds to the mean average tax rate (panels A and C) or tax credit (panel B) of taxpayers whose income is larger than
or equal to the point in the x-axis and less than the next point. For the last point, i.e. 9.8 (panels A and C) and 20 (panel B), the data
are calculated for incomes between 9.8 and 10.2 and between 20 and 21 of mean income, respectively.
by the top 40% (see the first column), a degree of progressiveness that is well captured by the tax
by the top 1%, although the revenue raised by the top 20% is well accounted for. In contrast, the
ever-increasing top marginal tax rate of the HSV function results in an over prediction of taxes
paid by the 20% and 1% richest taxpayers in the one-function approach.
Table 13 provides a comparison in terms of the percentage point difference of the distribution
of tax liabilities along the income distribution. As noted earlier, most tax revenue is accounted for
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Table 13
Evaluation of Tax Functions: Distribution of Tax Liabilities in 2015
(Percentage Points Difference with Respect to the Data)
One-Function Three-Functions
Approach Approach
Quantiles Data HSV GS HSV GS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1-5% 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5-10% -0.1% 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) -0.2% 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
2nd (20-40%) 0.7% 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1
3rd (40-60%) 7.0% 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.1
4th (60-80%) 19.4% -1.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.5
5th (80-100%) 73.2% 0.6 -0.1 0.2 0.4
Top
90-95% 13.8% -0.9 0.4 0.1 0.7
95-99% 20.6% -1.6 -0.3 -0.5 0.5
1% 21.0% 4.3 -0.5 0.3 -1.4
Notes: This table shows the percentage point difference of the distribution of tax liabilities
across income groups estimated from each tax function and the data. Columns (2) and (3) are
based on tax functions estimated from final tax liabilities, i.e. the one-function approach, see
Section 5.1. Column (2) displays the results of the HSV function, while column (3) is based on
the GS function. In columns (4) and (5) we report the results from the three-function approach.
This entails estimating one function each for general income tax rates, savings income tax rates
and tax credits. In column (4) the general income function is the HSV specification, whereas
in column (5) it is the GS function. The savings income tax rates are modeled by a linear
function with a kink and tax credits are estimated as in Guner et al. (2017). See Section 5.2
for more details.
functions. Also, as noted before, the main challenge is to account for the average rates of the very
rich. In this regard, it is worth noting that the differences are reasonably small, being lower than
1.5 percentage points in all specifications, except the HSV function in the one-function approach.
5.4 Changes in Effective Tax Rates since 2000
In panel A of Figure 7 we plot the average tax rates (normalized with respect to average income)
from the repeated cross-sections of the data for a selection of years. We can see that the narrative
account of the most significant policy actions adopted during 2002 to 2015 (see Section 2.2) helps
to interpret the changes in the tax curves. First, the 2003 tax cut implied a significant drop in
average tax rates with respect to 2002. Second, the tax cuts during the expansion led to further
downward movements of the tax curve, see the 2007 function. Third, the 2010-2011 tax increase
placed average tax rates above the levels observed in 2003, while the sharp increase in marginal
implemented during the crisis.45 Appendix Figure A.5 displays the estimation of the GS (panel
A) and HSV functions (panel B) for each year, while Table A.7 reports the parameter estimates.
45The picture encompassing the full set of years as well as the parameter estimates are available upon request.
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Figure 7
Over Time Evolution of Average Tax Rates (2002-2015)
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Notes: This figure shows the over time evolution of average tax
rates, constructed from the microdata for a selection of years.
For this reason, we use the tax functions to estimate, given gross income, the tax liabilities faced
by the household, as we explain below. After-tax income, in both the administrative and survey
data, is computed as gross income minus tax liabilities.
Starting with the tax data, columns (1) to (4) of Table 14 illustrate the progressiveness of
the tax code, by depicting the distribution of gross and after-tax income, for both individuals
and households. It is worth noting that after-tax income is substantially less unequal than gross
5.5 Effective Tax Functions for Households in 2013
The second column of Table 10 provides the parameter estimates of the tax function faced by
households in 2013, while Figure 8 gives a graphical representation. The panel A of the figure
shows that both the HSV and GS functions track very accurately the shape of average taxes
along the income distribution. Furthermore, in regard to differences by marital status, the panel
B shows that the HSV specification tends to over estimate the marginal tax rates of the richest
single households, which comprise around 45% of all households, while both functions are able to
capture well the tax curve of married households (see panel C).46
46Table A.8 in the online appendix depicts the parameter estimates.
6 After-tax Income
In this section we provide a brief account of after-tax income in both the tax and the survey (the
EFF) data. This allows us to evaluate the progressiveness of the tax code, by comparing gross
income and after-tax income figures. Note that in the survey data after-tax income is not observed.
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income. The Gini coefficient, for instance, declines by about 4 to 5 percentage points (from 0.42 to
0.38 for individuals, and from 0.45 to 0.40 for households), and the 90th to 10th percentile ratio is
reduced from 7.31 to 6.00 for individuals and from 7.89 to 6.50 for households. Along the income
distribution, the income share of the top 20% gets reduced by around 4 percentage points as a
result of the tax, while the rest of quintiles experiment an increase in their income share.
In columns (5) to (8) of the same table we present the after-tax income distribution estimated in
the survey data. We show the results for the two household definitions: fiscal household (comprising
the reference person and their spouse, in columns 5 and 6) and whole household (comprising all
Figure 8
Effective Average Tax Rates: Data and Functions
(Households, 2013)
Panel A: All households: Data and functions
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Panel B: Single Households
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Panel C: Married Households
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Notes: This figure plots the data as well as the effective average tax functions for households in 2013 (panel A). We also depict the
corresponding data and functions for single households (panel B) and married households (panel C). Each data point corresponds to
the mean average tax rate of taxpayers whose income is larger than or equal to the point in the x-axis and less than the next point.
The tax rate functions are evaluated at the corresponding x-axis point.
household members, in columns 7 and 8). As mentioned above, the EFF provides income solely in
gross terms. Hence, we make use of the estimated GS function from the tax data to approximate
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Table 14
After-Tax Income Distribution: Data and Estimates (GS Function)
Households 2013
Individuals 2015 Tax Data EFF Fiscal Household EFF Whole Household
Quantiles Gross
income
After-tax
income
Gross
income
After-tax
income
Gross
income
After-tax
income
Gross
income
After-tax
income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
1-5% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 0.8%
5-10% 1.0% 1.2% 1.0% 1.2% 1.2% 1.4% 1.2% 1.5%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 4.6% 5.3% 4.4% 5.2% 4.9% 5.8% 5.1% 6.2%
2nd (20-40%) 10.2% 11.8% 9.6% 10.9% 9.4% 10.6% 9.7% 11.0%
3rd (40-60%) 15.5% 16.9% 14.5% 15.7% 14.5% 15.7% 15.4% 16.3%
4th (60-80%) 22.7% 23.2% 21.7% 22.3% 22.7% 23.4% 22.6% 22.9%
5th (80-100%) 47.1% 42.8% 49.9% 45.8% 48.5% 44.6% 47.3% 43.7%
Top
90-95% 10.1% 9.5% 11.0% 10.5% 11.0% 10.3% 10.8% 10.3%
95-99% 11.9% 10.5% 13.2% 11.8% 13.0% 11.6% 12.5% 11.3%
1% 9.5% 7.6% 9.7% 7.7% 8.0% 6.6% 7.6% 6.6%
Other statistics
Gini coefficient 0.42 0.38 0.45 0.40 0.44 0.39 0.42 0.39
Var - log income 1.14 1.01 1.10 0.97 0.70 0.58 0.66 0.58
P90/P10 7.31 6.00 7.89 6.50 7.48 6.10 7.01 6.15
P50/P10 3.15 2.93 3.00 2.75 2.73 2.54 2.73 2.56
P90/P50 2.32 2.05 2.63 2.36 2.74 2.40 2.56 2.40
Notes: This table depicts the gross and after-tax income distributions from tax data for individuals in 2015
(columns 1 and 2), households in 2013 (columns 3 and 4) and the gross and after-tax income distributions of
the Survey of Household Finances (EFF, columns 5 to 8). After-tax income is computed by subtracting the
tax liabilities from gross income. Households in the EFF are constructed under two alternative definitions:
fiscal household (columns 5 and 6), comprising the head and their partner, and whole household (columns 7
and 8), including all household members. Note that the gross income in column (5) is the result of aggregating
incomes from all members of the household even if they are negative, while column (7) is estimated for all
members of the household restricted to have positive gross income and non-negative income sources. The
after-tax income in the EFF (columns 6 and 8) are estimated by applying the estimated household tax
function of the GS specification to the gross household income in EFF.
those observed in the tax data.47 Hence, the application of the tax functions to the survey data
the tax liabilities faced by each household in the survey, and then compute after-tax income. For
the definition of fiscal household, we apply the household tax function. For the whole household
definition, we apply the household tax function for the reference person and their spouse, the
individual function for the remaining household members, and then we aggregate each member’s
after-tax income at the household level. We find that the estimated after-tax income distributions
in the survey data are able to capture the shift from the gross to net income distribution that we
observed in the tax data. Specifically, the first four quintiles experience an increase in their income
share, while the top 20% undergoes a reduction, the magnitude of the changes being similar to
47Note that the HSV function provides comparable results, see Table A.9 in the online appendix.
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In Tables 15 and 16 we report how gross and after-tax income inequality have changed in recent
years. In the individual data the Gini coefficient remains relatively stable during the sample period,
while there is an increase of the 90th to 10th and 50th to 10th percentile ratios in the wake of the
financial crisis, suggesting larger inequality within taxpayers. This increase can be explained by
the evolution of income shares along the income distribution, which are depicted in Tables A.10
can provide a fruitful approach to analyze after-tax income in this type of datasets, even if the
actual information is missing.
48See also Tables A.12 and A.13 for the evolution of household gross and after-tax income shares during the
sample period, respectively.
and A.11 in the online appendix. In this respect, it is worth noting the income share decline of the
bottom 20% of taxpayers. Regarding the household tax data, while overall inequality, as captured
by the Gini index, seems to have increased in the run-up to the crisis and decreased thereafter,
the percentile ratios shows somewhat the opposite trend, see Table 16.48
Table 15
Evolution of Gross and After-Tax Income Inequality
Indices in Tax Returns (Individuals)
Quantiles 2003 2004 2007 2010 2013 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gross income
Gini coefficient 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.42
Var - log income 0.81 0.78 0.81 1.03 1.07 1.14
P90/P10 5.84 5.82 5.75 6.19 7.07 7.31
P50/P10 2.47 2.47 2.44 2.67 3.07 3.15
P90/P50 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.32 2.30 2.32
After-tax income
Gini coefficient 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.38
Var - log income 0.72 0.68 0.70 0.91 0.94 1.01
P90/P10 4.95 4.93 4.78 5.09 5.75 6.00
P50/P10 2.34 2.33 2.27 2.48 2.83 2.93
P90/P50 2.12 2.11 2.1 2.06 2.03 2.05
Notes: This table accounts for the over time evolution of gross and after-tax income inequality indices,
according to the individual tax return data.
In Table 17 we depict the evolution of the household gross income distribution as computed
from the different waves of the EFF. They point to a rather stable distribution, at least with
respect to the selected inequality indices. Tables A.14 and A.15 in the online appendix show
the corresponding evolution in the gross and after-tax income shares, respectively. Interestingly,
the over time pattern is comparable to that found in the tax data (see Tables A.12 and A.13).
Regarding gross income, the income share of the top 20% in the survey data experienced an
increase in the run-up to the financial crisis, and a drop thereafter, while the following 20%
followed the opposite pattern. With respect to after-tax income, the evolution, as estimated with
the GS function, points towards larger income shares of the top 1% during 2004-2007 and a large
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Table 16
Evolution of Gross and After-tax Income Inequality Indices
in Tax Returns (Households)
Quantiles 2004 2007 2010 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gross income
Gini coefficient 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.45
Var - log income 0.91 0.94 1.18 1.10
P90/P10 7.45 7.23 7.64 7.89
P50/P10 2.65 2.65 2.85 3.00
P90/P50 2.81 2.73 2.68 2.63
After-tax income
Gini coefficient 0.42 0.44 0.41 0.40
Var - log income 0.81 0.82 1.06 0.97
P90/P10 6.30 6.09 6.40 6.50
P50/P10 2.50 2.45 2.63 2.75
P90/P50 2.52 2.49 2.44 2.36
Notes: This table accounts for the over time evolution of gross and after-tax
income inequality indices, according to the tax return data aggregated by house-
hold.
Table 17
Evolution of Gross and After-tax Inequality Indices
in EFF (Fiscal Households)
Quantiles 2004 2007 2010 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gross income
Gini coefficient 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.44
Var - log income 0.75 0.68 0.78 0.70
P90/P10 7.13 7.44 7.40 7.48
P50/P10 2.72 2.94 2.67 2.73
P90/P50 2.62 2.53 2.77 2.74
After-tax income
Gini coefficient 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.39
Var - log income 0.66 0.58 0.67 0.58
P90/P10 6.04 6.26 6.16 6.10
P50/P10 2.57 2.75 2.51 2.54
P90/P10 2.35 2.27 2.45 2.40
Notes: This table depicts the over time evolution of some inequality indices of
gross and after-tax income as estimated in the EFF. Households are defined as
fiscal households, i.e. they include the reference person and their spouse. Gross
Income is directly observed in the EFF, while after-tax income is estimated by
applying the household GS tax function estimated in Section 5.5 to gross income.
49Using the HSV delivers similar results, see Table A.16 in the online appendix.
contraction during the financial crisis, while the top 20% underwent a decrease in its income share
in 2010-2013. Regarding the middle of the income distribution, it renders a rather stable path,
with some gains for the fourth quintile at the end of the sample period.49
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distribution of gross income and its sources, taxable income, tax benefits, tax liabilities and after-
tax income, as well as effective average and marginal tax rates. We do so for individuals and for
households, defining the latter as either joint declarations or as two individual declarations from
the same household and differentiate between single and married. We also briefly review how the
PIT legislation and the effective tax rates have changed during the period of the analysis.
A second contribution of the paper is the estimation of parametric functions of the effective
average tax rates that can be readily used in applied work. We follow two different approaches.
First, we estimate a single expression for the final tax liabilities as a function of gross income.
Second, we estimate three different functions, one for the general tax rates that apply to the
general taxable income, one for the savings tax rates, applied to the savings taxable income, and
one for the tax credits. Both approaches generate a distribution of tax liabilities that is very close
to the one we observe in the data.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we exploit a rich uncensored administrative dataset of tax returns for the years 2002
to 2015 to present key facts about the Spanish Personal Income Tax system. We focus on the
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Appendix
Table A.1
Descriptive Statistics of Different Samples (2015)
% of
Taxpayers
Gross
Income (e)
Labor
Income (e)
Capital
Income (e)
Self-
employment
Income (e)
Average
Tax Rate
Age % of Single
Filers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All taxpayers 100.0% 23,933 20,231 2,376 1,326 7.7% 50.2 79.8%
Positive total income 98.8% 24,289 20,474 2,419 1,395 7.7% 50.3 79.7%
+ Non-negative
income sources 96.7% 24,292 20,447 2,410 1,435 7.7% 50.4 80.0%
+ Average tax rate
below statutory max.
(final sample) 96.7% 24,291 20,447 2,410 1,435 7.7% 50.4 80.0%
Notes: This table depicts the average of the column variables of all taxpayers (first row) and of those restricted to meet certain criteria
(second to fourth rows, where each criterion is added to those of the previous row). Taxpayers in the final sample fulfill the following
criteria: they earn a positive amount of gross income, they have non-negative gross income sources (labor, capital and self-employment),
and they face an average tax rate below the statutory maximum marginal tax rate.
A Additional Tables
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Table A.2
Distribution of Individual Income and Income Sources: Ages 16-64 (2015)
Quantiles Income Definition Gross Income Sources
Gross
Income
Adjusted
Gross
Income
Taxable
Income
Labor
Income
Capital
Income
Self-
employment
Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
1-5% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 1.0% 0.7%
5-10% 0.9% 0.3% 0.3% 0.8% 1.5% 2.0%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 4.3% 1.8% 1.8% 3.8% 6.2% 8.3%
2nd (20-40%) 10.2% 8.2% 8.2% 10.1% 7.5% 14.7%
3rd (40-60%) 15.5% 15.5% 15.3% 16.1% 9.5% 14.8%
4th (60-80%) 22.8% 23.4% 23.3% 24.3% 12.3% 15.1%
5th (80-100%) 47.2% 51.0% 51.3% 45.8% 64.5% 47.1%
Top
90-95% 10.3% 11.0% 11.0% 10.7% 8.2% 7.4%
95-99% 12.1% 13.2% 13.2% 11.9% 13.9% 13.1%
1% 9.0% 10.3% 10.6% 6.3% 32.9% 18.5%
Other statistics
Gini coefficient 0.43 0.49 0.5 0.46 0.9 0.95
Var - log income 1.19 3.41 3.31 0.92 8.75 3.08
P90/P10 8.09 22.71 22.67 8.03 1691.02 74.40
P50/P10 3.42 9.11 8.94 3.51 113.02 17.14
P90/P50 2.37 2.49 2.53 2.29 14.96 4.34
Notes: This table displays the distribution of gross income, adjusted gross income and taxable income, as
well as the distribution of gross income sources (labor, capital, and self-employment) for the sample of 2015
individuals aged 16-64. The Gini coefficient in columns (4) to (6) are computed including the observations
with zero income, while the percentile ratios of those columns exclude them.
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Table A.3
Individual Gross Income Cutoffs
and Average Income Levels: Ages 16-64 (e, 2015)
Quantiles Cutoffs Average Income
Gross
Income
Gross
Income
Labor
Income
Capital
Income
Self-
employment
Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bottom
1% 0 106 21 76 9
1-5% 313 1,726 974 445 307
5-10% 3,177 4,526 3,327 529 670
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 0 5,222 3,993 547 681
2nd (20-40%) 9,301 12,527 10,654 658 1,214
3rd (40-60%) 15,664 19,074 17,025 833 1,216
4th (60-80%) 22,974 27,963 25,633 1,084 1,245
5th (80-100%) 34,192 58,038 48,479 5,672 3,887
Top
90-95% 44,847 50,780 45,460 2,875 2,445
95-99% 58,758 74,219 62,725 6,108 5,386
1% 106,662 221,302 132,948 57,907 30,448
Notes: This table displays the gross income cutoffs as well as the average of gross income
sources across the gross income distribution according to the 2015 sample of taxpayers aged
16-64.
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Table A.4
Sources of Individual Tax Deductions (2015)
Quantiles Social
Security
Contribu-
tions
Labor
Income
Joint
Filing
Contribu-
tions to
Private
Pensions
Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bottom
1% 3.8% 36.4% 26.4% 1.8% 31.6%
1-5% 4.0% 71.3% 11.4% 2.2% 11.0%
5-10% 3.6% 84.9% 4.7% 1.9% 5.0%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 4.2% 82.7% 6.0% 1.8% 5.3%
2nd (20-40%) 9.2% 79.2% 8.3% 1.6% 1.7%
3rd (40-60%) 22.7% 58.7% 14.2% 2.5% 1.9%
4th (60-80%) 28.4% 53.7% 12.4% 3.4% 2.1%
5th (80-100%) 32.9% 43.2% 9.7% 10.2% 3.9%
Top
90-95% 36.9% 40.4% 8.7% 10.4% 3.6%
95-99% 34.8% 34.5% 7.7% 17.8% 5.2%
1% 25.5% 28.2% 6.9% 27.2% 12.1%
Total 20.0% 62.8% 10.3% 4.0% 2.9%
Notes: This table shows the distribution of different tax deductions across the income distri-
bution. Each row adds up to 100.
Table A.5
Sources of Individual Tax Credits (2015)
Quantiles Family
Allowance
House
Purchases
Employed
Mothers
Large
Families
Regional Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bottom
1% 98.1% 0.0% 0.7% 0.8% 0.0% 0.4%
1-5% 95.3% 0.0% 2.2% 1.8% 0.0% 0.7%
5-10% 93.8% 0.1% 3.2% 2.1% 0.0% 0.8%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 95.3% 0.4% 2.4% 1.4% 0.0% 0.5%
2nd (20-40%) 93.7% 2.8% 1.8% 0.8% 0.6% 0.3%
3rd (40-60%) 86.5% 7.5% 1.3% 0.6% 1.5% 2.7%
4th (60-80%) 86.1% 8.9% 1.2% 0.5% 1.1% 2.1%
5th (80-100%) 83.5% 10.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.5% 3.3%
Top
90-95% 82.7% 11.5% 0.9% 1.0% 0.5% 3.4%
95-99% 80.7% 12.5% 0.7% 1.3% 0.5% 4.3%
1% 77.1% 11.3% 0.4% 1.8% 0.3% 9.0%
Total 88.7% 6.3% 1.5% 0.8% 0.8% 1.8%
Notes: This table shows the distribution of different tax credits across the income distribution. Each row
adds up to 100.
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Table A.6
Parametric Estimates of the
Average Tax Functions: Ages 16-64
Functions Individuals
2015
Households
2013
(1) (2)
HSV
λ 0.8974 0.8836
(0.0000) (0.0001)
τ 0.1474 0.1192
(0.0001) (0.0002)
I¯ 48% 35%
MSE 0.0011171 0.0018804
GS
b 0.3505 0.3669
(0.0004) (0.0012)
s 0.0005 0.0041
(0.0000) (0.0001)
p 2.4291 1.5024
(0.0063) (0.0071)
I¯ 54% 42%
MSE 0.0011230 0.0019119
Notes: This table shows the parameter estimates of the effective average tax functions for 2015
individuals aged 16-64 and for households in 2013 whose principal earner is aged 16-64. I¯ is
the percentage of mean income below which the effective taxes are estimated to be zero. Each
column accounts for a different sample: individuals in 2015 and households in 2013. MSE
stands for mean squared error. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 50 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1907
Table A.7
Parametric Estimates of the Average Tax Functions
(Individuals, 2002-2015)
Functions 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HSV
λ 0.8970 0.9078 0.9033 0.8970 0.8894 0.8913 0.9053
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
τ 0.1252 0.1241 0.1229 0.1195 0.1156 0.1245 0.1379
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
I¯ 42% 46% 44% 40% 36% 40% 49%
MSE 0.0014169 0.0013896 0.0014271 0.0014982 0.0015983 0.0014470 0.0011394
GS
b 0.3459 0.3174 0.3090 0.3017 0.2876 0.3032 0.3191
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
s 0.0020 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p 2.0628 2.4855 2.5488 2.5528 2.7027 2.6345 2.9935
(0.0058) (0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0069)
I¯ 36% 17% 16% 15% 14% 40% 45%
MSE 0.0013912 0.0013571 0.0013885 0.0014525 0.0015260 0.0014141 0.0011074
Functions 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
HSV
λ 0.9069 0.8944 0.8942 0.8916 0.8902 0.8894 0.8985
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
τ 0.1395 0.1398 0.1402 0.1548 0.1553 0.1540 0.1483
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
I¯ 50% 45% 45% 48% 47% 47% 49%
MSE 0.0011167 0.0012300 0.0011788 0.0012360 0.0011890 0.0012009 0.0011271
GS
b 0.3459 0.3174 0.3090 0.3017 0.2876 0.3032 0.3191
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
s 0.0020 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p 2.0628 2.4855 2.5488 2.5528 2.7027 2.6345 2.9935
(0.0058) (0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0069)
I¯ 36% 17% 16% 15% 14% 40% 45%
MSE 0.0013912 0.0013571 0.0013885 0.0014525 0.0015260 0.0014141 0.0011074
Notes: This table shows the parameter estimates of the effective average tax functions for individuals in 2002 to 2015. I¯
is the percentage of mean income below which the effective taxes are estimated to be zero. MSE stands for mean squared
error. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table A.8
Parametric Estimates of the Household Tax Functions
by Marital Status (2013)
Functions All
Households
Single
Households
Married
Households
(1) (2) (3)
HSV
λ 0.8823 0.8454 0.9043
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
τ 0.1224 0.1517 0.1343
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
I¯ 36% 33% 47%
MSE 0.0018442 0.0010442 0.0015058
GS
b 0.3283 0.3220 0.3416
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
s 0.0019 0.0002 0.0005
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
p 1.8810 3.0124 2.2084
(0.0085) (0.0240) (0.0101)
I¯ 42% 40% 47%
MSE 0.0018817 0.0010444 0.0015377
Notes: This table shows the parameter estimates of the effective average tax functions for
households by marital status. I¯ is the percentage of mean income below which the effective
taxes are estimated to be zero. MSE stands for mean squared error. Standard errors are in
parenthesis.
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Table A.9
After-Tax Household Income Distribution (2013):
Tax Data vs EFF - HSV Function
Tax Data EFF Fiscal Household EFF Whole Household
Quantiles Gross
Income
After-tax
Income
Gross
Income
After-tax
Income
Gross
Income
After-tax
Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
1-5% 0.3% 0.4% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 0.8%
5-10% 1.0% 1.2% 1.2% 1.4% 1.2% 1.5%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 4.4% 5.2% 4.9% 5.8% 5.1% 6.2%
2nd (20-40%) 9.6% 10.9% 9.4% 10.7% 9.7% 11.1%
3rd (40-60%) 14.5% 15.7% 14.5% 15.7% 15.4% 16.3%
4th (60-80%) 21.7% 22.3% 22.7% 23.3% 22.6% 22.8%
5th (80-100%) 49.9% 45.8% 48.5% 44.6% 47.3% 43.6%
Top
90-95% 11.0% 10.5% 11.0% 10.4% 10.8% 10.2%
95-99% 13.2% 11.8% 13.0% 11.7% 12.5% 11.4%
1% 9.7% 7.7% 8.0% 6.4% 7.6% 6.4%
Other statistics
Gini coefficient 0.45 0.40 0.44 0.39 0.42 0.39
Var - log income 1.10 0.97 0.70 0.58 0.66 0.58
P90/P10 7.89 6.50 7.48 6.14 7.01 6.14
P50/P10 3.00 2.75 2.73 2.53 2.73 2.53
P90/P50 2.63 2.36 2.74 2.42 2.56 2.42
Notes: This table shows the distribution of gross and after-tax income from the tax return data aggregated
at the household level and the Survey of Household Finances (EFF). Households in the EFF are constructed
under two alternative definitions: fiscal household (columns 3 and 4), which consists of the head and their
partner, and whole household (columns 5 and 6), which includes all household members. Note that the gross
income in column (3) is the result of aggregating incomes from all members of the household even if they
are negative, while column (5) is estimated for all members of the household restricted to have positive gross
income and non-negative income sources. The after-tax income in the EFF (columns 6 and 8) are estimated
by applying the estimated household tax function of the HSV specification to the gross household income in
EFF.
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Table A.10
Evolution of the Gross Income Distribution in Tax Returns (Individuals)
Quantiles 2003 2004 2007 2010 2013 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
1-5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3%
5-10% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 5.5% 5.6% 5.5% 5.2% 4.8% 4.6%
2nd (20-40%) 10.8% 10.8% 10.5% 10.7% 10.5% 10.2%
3rd (40-60%) 15.1% 15.1% 14.8% 15.6% 15.8% 15.5%
4th (60-80%) 21.8% 21.7% 21.2% 22.6% 23.0% 22.7%
5th (80-100%) 46.7% 46.9% 48.0% 46.0% 46.0% 47.1%
Top
90-95% 10.1% 10.1% 10.0% 10.2% 10.2% 10.1%
95-99% 12.2% 12.2% 12.3% 12.0% 11.9% 11.9%
1% 9.2% 9.6% 10.9% 8.2% 8.1% 9.5%
Other statistics
Gini coefficient 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.42
Var - log income 0.81 0.78 0.81 1.03 1.07 1.14
P90/P10 5.84 5.82 5.75 6.19 7.07 7.31
P50/P10 2.47 2.47 2.44 2.67 3.07 3.15
P90/P50 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.32 2.30 2.32
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Table A.11
Evolution of the After-Tax Income Distribution in Tax Returns (Individuals)
Quantiles 2003 2004 2007 2010 2013 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
1-5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4%
5-10% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 1.2% 1.2%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 6.3% 6.4% 6.4% 6.1% 5.6% 5.3%
2nd (20-40%) 12.1% 12.0% 11.8% 12.1% 12.1% 11.8%
3rd (40-60%) 16.3% 16.2% 16.0% 16.9% 17.2% 16.9%
4th (60-80%) 22.5% 22.3% 21.7% 23.0% 23.6% 23.2%
5th (80-100%) 42.9% 43.1% 44.1% 41.9% 41.6% 42.8%
Top
90-95% 9.6% 9.5% 9.4% 9.5% 9.6% 9.5%
95-99% 10.8% 10.8% 10.9% 10.6% 10.4% 10.5%
1% 7.5% 8.0% 9.3% 6.6% 6.3% 7.6%
Other statistics
Gini coefficient 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.38
Var - log income 0.72 0.68 0.70 0.91 0.94 1.01
P90/P10 4.95 4.93 4.78 5.09 5.75 6.00
P50/P10 2.34 2.33 2.27 2.48 2.83 2.93
P90/P50 2.12 2.11 2.1 2.06 2.03 2.05
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Table A.12
Evolution of the Gross Income Distribution in Tax Returns
(Households)
Quantiles 2004 2007 2010 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
1-5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3%
5-10% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 4.7% 4.6% 4.4% 4.4%
2nd (20-40%) 9.4% 9.0% 9.4% 9.6%
3rd (40-60%) 13.8% 13.3% 14.2% 14.5%
4th (60-80%) 20.7% 20.1% 21.5% 21.7%
5th (80-100%) 51.4% 53.0% 50.4% 49.9%
Top
90-95% 10.9% 10.8% 11.2% 11.0%
95-99% 13.5% 13.6% 13.5% 13.2%
1% 11.3% 13.4% 9.7% 9.7%
Other statistics
Gini coefficient 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.45
Var - log income 0.91 0.94 1.18 1.10
P90/P10 7.45 7.23 7.64 7.89
P50/P10 2.65 2.65 2.85 3.00
P90/P50 2.81 2.73 2.68 2.63
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Table A.13
Evolution of the After-Tax Income Distribution in Tax Returns
(Households)
Quantiles 2004 2007 2010 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
1-5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4%
5-10% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 5.4% 5.4% 5.2% 5.2%
2nd (20-40%) 10.5% 10.1% 10.7% 10.9%
3rd (40-60%) 14.9% 14.4% 15.4% 15.7%
4th (60-80%) 21.4% 20.7% 22.1% 22.3%
5th (80-100%) 47.9% 49.4% 46.7% 45.8%
Top
90-95% 10.5% 10.3% 10.7% 10.5%
95-99% 12.2% 12.3% 12.2% 11.8%
1% 9.7% 11.7% 8.0% 7.7%
Other statistics
Gini coefficient 0.42 0.44 0.41 0.40
Var - log income 0.81 0.82 1.06 0.97
P90/P10 6.30 6.09 6.40 6.50
P50/P10 2.50 2.45 2.63 2.75
P90/P50 2.52 2.49 2.44 2.36
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Table A.14
Evolution of the Gross Income Distribution in EFF
(Fiscal Households)
Quantiles 2004 2007 2010 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
1-5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.7%
5-10% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 5.1% 4.9% 4.7% 4.9%
2nd (20-40%) 9.8% 9.5% 9.0% 9.4%
3rd (40-60%) 14.6% 14.7% 14.3% 14.5%
4th (60-80%) 21.7% 21.7% 22.1% 22.7%
5th (80-100%) 48.9% 49.2% 49.9% 48.5%
Top
90-95% 11.3% 10.8% 10.9% 11.0%
95-99% 13.1% 12.5% 13.4% 13.0%
1% 8.6% 10.3% 9.1% 8.0%
Other statistics
Gini coefficient 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.44
Var - log income 0.75 0.68 0.78 0.70
P90/P10 7.13 7.44 7.40 7.48
P50/P10 2.72 2.94 2.67 2.73
P90/P50 2.62 2.53 2.77 2.74
Notes: This table shows the evolution of gross income as estimated in the EFF.
Households are defined as fiscal households, i.e. they include the reference person
and their spouse.
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Table A.15
Evolution of the After-tax Income Distribution in EFF:
GS Function - Fiscal Households
Quantiles 2004 2007 2010 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
1-5% 0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.8%
5-10% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 5.7% 5.7% 5.4% 5.8%
2nd (20-40%) 10.8% 10.5% 10.2% 10.6%
3rd (40-60%) 15.7% 15.8% 15.4% 15.7%
4th (60-80%) 22.3% 22.3% 22.7% 23.4%
5th (80-100%) 45.5% 45.9% 46.2% 44.6%
Top
90-95% 10.6% 10.2% 10.3% 10.3%
95-99% 11.9% 11.4% 12.1% 11.6%
1% 7.3% 8.8% 7.7% 6.6%
Other statistics
Gini coefficient 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.39
Var - log income 0.66 0.58 0.67 0.58
P90/P10 6.04 6.26 6.16 6.10
P50/P10 2.57 2.75 2.51 2.54
P90/P10 2.35 2.27 2.45 2.40
Notes: This table shows the evolution of after-tax income as estimated in the
EFF. Households are defined as fiscal households, i.e. they include the reference
person and their spouse. After-tax income is estimated by applying the GS tax
function as estimated in column (2) of Table 10 to the household gross income.
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Table A.16
Evolution of the After-tax Income Distribution in EFF:
HSV Function - Fiscal Households
Quantiles 2004 2007 2010 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bottom
1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
1-5% 0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.8%
5-10% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
Quintiles
1st (bottom 20%) 5.7% 5.7% 5.5% 5.8%
2nd (20-40%) 10.9% 10.5% 10.2% 10.7%
3rd (40-60%) 15.6% 15.8% 15.5% 15.7%
4th (60-80%) 22.2% 22.3% 22.7% 23.3%
5th (80-100%) 45.6% 45.7% 46.1% 44.6%
Top
90-95% 10.8% 10.3% 10.4% 10.4%
95-99% 12.1% 11.6% 12.2% 11.7%
1% 7.1% 8.2% 7.3% 6.4%
Other statistics
Gini coefficient 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.39
Var - log income 0.65 0.58 0.67 0.58
P90/P10 6.08 6.31 6.19 6.14
P50/P10 2.55 2.74 2.51 2.53
P90/P10 2.38 2.31 2.47 2.42
Gini 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.39
Var - log 0.65 0.58 0.67 0.58
Notes: This table depicts the over time evolution of after-tax income as estimated
in the EFF. Households are defined as fiscal households, i.e. they include the
reference person and their spouse. After-tax income is estimated by applying the
HSV tax function as estimated in column (2) of Table 10 to the household gross
income.
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B Additional Figures
Figure A.1
Mean and Median of Individual Effective Tax Rates (2015)
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Notes: This figure depicts the 2015 mean and median of effective
average tax rates (± 2 standard deviations) across different multiples
of mean income. Each data point corresponds to the mean average
tax rate of taxpayers whose income is larger than or equal to the
point in the x-axis and less than the next point. For the last point
(9.8), the tax rate is calculated for incomes between 9.8 and 10.2 of
mean income.
Figure A.2
One-function Approach: Mean Squared Error
of each Specification
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Notes: This figure depicts the MSE of the two tax functions es-
timated in Section 5.1. Note that the minimization of the MSE
determines the income level below which the tax rate is estimated
to be zero.
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Figure A.3
Individual Effective Average Tax Rates
by Marital Status (2015)
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Notes: The tax rate functions are evaluated at the corresponding
point in the x-axis.
Figure A.4
Effective Tax Functions: Ages 16-64 (Individuals, 2015)
Panel A: Average Tax Rates
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Panel B: Marginal Tax Rates
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Notes: This figure plots the mean effective tax rates by income level as well as the predicted rates resulting from the estimated tax
functions (HSV and GS specifications) for individuals aged 16-64. The panel A shows the effective average tax rates, whereas the panel
B depicts the implied marginal rate functions. Each data point corresponds to the mean tax rate of taxpayers whose income is larger
than or equal to the point in the x-axis and less than the next point. For the last point (9.8), the tax rate is calculated for incomes
between 9.8 and 10.2 of mean income. The tax rate functions are evaluated at the corresponding point in the x-axis. The parametric
estimates of the average tax rate functions can be found in the first column of Table A.6. See section 4.2 for details on the computation
of effective marginal rates.
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Figure A.5
Changes in Effective Tax Functions (2002-2015)
Panel A: Gouveia and Strauss (GS)
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Panel B: Heathcote et al. (HSV )
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the GS (panel A) and HSV (panel B) effective tax functions over time.
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